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The Institutional Progress Clause
Jake Linford*
ABSTRACT
There is a curious anomaly at the intersection of copyright and
free speech. In cases like Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission, the United States Supreme Court has exhibited a
profound distaste for tailoring free speech rights and restrictions based
on the identity of the speaker. The Copyright Act, however, is full of
such tailoring, extending special rights to some classes of copyright
owners and special defenses to some classes of users. A Supreme Court
serious about maintaining speaker neutrality would be appalled.
A set of compromises at the heart of the Copyright Act reflects
interest-group lobbying rather than a careful consideration of what
kinds of institutions best realize the goal of the Progress Clause-the
provision that expressly empowers Congress to provide copyright
protection. Assuming the democratic process is flawed for predictable
public-choice reasons, how might the Court address these problems in
the Copyright Act?
The answer is institutional analysis. First Amendment scholars
have for some years used institutions as analytical and normative
tools. That framework considers how different social institutions may
serve First Amendment goals-like creating a robust marketplace of
ideas-through their structure and function. This Article is the first to
explore how the Progress Clause can serve a similar role and provides a
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framework to consider whether certain institutions are particularly
well-suited to enable the creation, dissemination, or preservation of
valuable expression. Inasmuch as Congress has granted special
privileges to institutions that serve Progress Clause values, the
speaker-based tailoring is constitutionally acceptable-even if the
process by which it occurs is suspect. Applying this institutional
framework can help clarify not only the extent to which the current
Copyright Act achieves the constitutional goals it was crafted to reach,
but also when Congress should adopt or reject amendments and
extensions to the Copyright Act.
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Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution-sometimes
referred to as the "Progress Clause"-authorizes Congress to grant "to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries,"' i.e., copyright and patent protection. This power is
internally limited by the Progress Clause, which authorizes the grant
of an exclusive right only "for limited times" and for the stated
purpose of "promot[ing] the progress of Science and useful Arts." 2 The
First Amendment also limits the authority to grant copyright
protection because, as the Court has recognized, "some restriction on
expression is the inherent and intended effect of every grant of
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. Id.; see, e.g., Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause:
Promotion of Progress as a Limitation on Congress's Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J.
1771, 1810-16 (2006).
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copyright."3  While commentators have argued that copyright laws
should be subject to "procedural and substantive" First Amendment
constraints, 4 the Supreme Court has not applied searching First
Amendment scrutiny to any provision of the Copyright Act to date. 5
There is something nevertheless puzzling about the
relationship between copyright protection and free expression. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly invalidated statutes that discriminate
among classes of speakers. 6  For example, in Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission, the Court held unconstitutional a
federal statute barring independent expenditures in elections based on
the speaker's corporate identity.7 But the Copyright Act is filled with
provisions that run counter to this principle of speaker neutrality,
instead providing a broader range of copyright protections to certain
classes of speakers,8 which this Article, following the relevant
literature, refers to as "institutions."9  Scholars and courts have
3. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 889-90 (2012) (noting that Congressional activity
will not trigger First Amendment scrutiny so long as Congress does not alter the traditional
contours of copyright law that provide "built-in First Amendment accommodations" (citing
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003))).
4. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright within the First Amendment Skein,
54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 47 (2001) [hereinafter Netanel, First Amendment Skein]; see also Jed
Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 59 (2002)
("Copyright is today in the same position, vis-h-vis the First Amendment, as libel was before New
York Times v. Sullivan. Just as the Court in Sullivan finally began issuing a set of special
constitutional rules confining the reach of libel law, so the courts must eventually do for
copyright.").
5. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890 (2012) (rejecting a call to engage in
"heightened [First Amendment] review" because the provision under review did not disturb
traditional speech-protective contours built into the Copyright Act like the idea-expression
distinction or the fair use defense); see also Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First
Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1783
[hereinafter Schauer, Boundaries] (2004) ("Copyright law, especially recently, has been the
subject of some criticism, but its pervasive regime of content regulation and prior restraint
remains largely unimpeded by the First Amendment."). Indeed, until fairly recently,
constitutional law scholars tended to overlook the Progress Clause. See Adam Mossoff, Who
Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent "Privilege" in
Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 955 n.7 (2007).
6. See infra Part I.A.
7. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010).
8. For example, Congress recently restored copyright protection to the works of foreign
nationals whose works fell into the public domain without restoring the copyright of works by US
authors. 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2012); see also infra Part 1II.B. Other provisions grant unique
defenses to certain institutions against the copyright owners' exclusive right. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C.
§ 108 (2012) (granting specific exceptions to copyright liability to libraries and other archives);
see also infra Parts III.A, III.C.
9. In the article that launched the field of new institutional economics, Douglass C.
North defined institutions broadly, as "the humanly devised constraints that structure human
interaction," including formal and informal constraints. Douglass C. North, Economic
Performance Through Time, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 359, 360 (1994). Some intellectual property
scholars have taken a similarly broad approach in defining First Amendment institutions-like
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acknowledged the speech-restrictive potential of copyright
protection,'0 which raises the possibility that much of the current
Copyright Act may be unconstitutional because it favors groups in a
way inconsistent with the Court's commitment to speaker neutrality
in the free speech arena."
Many scholars have pushed back on the Court's resistance to
institutional tailoring in interpreting the Speech Clause.' 2 As argued
by scholars like Frederick Schauer, institutions like libraries,
universities, and the professional press might deserve "special
solicitude" under the Speech Clause because in their typical operation,
they advance First Amendment goals. 13 The Court has rejected
institutional tailoring in the speech domain,14 but it has been more
sympathetic to institutional tailoring when justified on other
constitutional grounds. For example, in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the
best practices in content-creating and content-using industries-that might deserve deferential
treatment from Congress and the courts. See, e.g., Michael J. Madison, Some Optimism About
Fair Use and Copyright Law, 57 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 351, 358 (2010). This Article instead
follows Paul Horwitz and uses a narrower construction that defines institutions as organizations,
focusing more on the entities that can embody "institutional norms," rather than the norms
themselves. See PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 11 (2013).
10. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text; see infra notes 101-114 and
accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 392-93 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[The text of
the First Amendment] offers no foothold for excluding any category of speaker, from single
individuals to partnerships of individuals, to unincorporated associations of individuals, to
incorporated associations of individuals .... "); Peter DiCola, Copyright Equality, Free Speech,
Efficiency, and Regulatory Parity in Distribution, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1837, 1891-92 (2013) (arguing
that courts should review copyright's unequal regulatory provisions to the same First
Amendment scrutiny that other media regulations receive).
12. See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 461, 471 (2005)
[hereinafter Horwitz, Grutter's] (suggesting that Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), can be
read as the rare case in which the Supreme Court takes institutions seriously); Frederick
Schauer, Institutions as Legal and Constitutional Categories, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1747, 1765 (2007)
[hereinafter Schauer, Categories] ("[Miost of the arguments against using institution -specific
categories in law in general and in constitutional law in particular do not carry the day.");
Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84, 97
(1998) [hereinafter Schauer, Principles] (arguing that apparent departures from standard First
Amendment analysis in the cases of Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, 523
U.S. 666 (1998), which held that a public broadcaster can reasonably exclude an independent
candidate from a presidential debate, and National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S.
569 (1998), which held that a regulation that required the NEA to take general standards of
"decency and respect" for religious beliefs into account in denying grant applications was not
facially invalid or unconstitutionally vague, can be explained and justified "in terms of
institutionally specific rules and principles").
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. See, e.g., Sonja R. West, Press Exceptionalism, 127 HARv. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014)
(manuscript at 6) (noting that "the Court has [ignored the textual directive of the Press Clause
and] extended to the press no protection beyond the rights guaranteed to all by the Speech
Clause").
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Court held that the Free Expression Clause of the First Amendment
extends "special solicitude" to the rights of religious institutions.
15
This Article adds to that literature by arguing that institutions
may also have the potential to inherently serve "Progress" values. For
example, some institutions, like universities, include among their
traditional functions the progress value of increasing and cataloging
the storehouse of human knowledge. Others institutions may serve
key roles in disseminating new works to the public and providing a
reward for creators. Some disparate treatment might thus be justified
under the Progress Clause even if it is not justified under the First
Amendment.
Part 0 sets the stage by describing the limits that the Progress
Clause and the First Amendment place on Congressional authority to
enact copyright protection and discussing how the disparate treatment
built into the Copyright Act may run afoul of the Court's First
Amendment bar against speaker-based regulation. Part 0 builds on
existing literature in the First Amendment sphere to argue that the
Copyright Act may be partially redeemed by identifying institutions
that externalize three key "Progress Clause values": incentivizing
creation and dissemination, expanding knowledge, and providing
public access. Part 0 applies the proposed institutional review
framework to several provisions of the Copyright Act, highlighting
examples of more- and less-appropriate tailoring. Part 0 identifies
how the institutional review framework shows potential to improve
judicial review, encourage public activism, and shape interest-group
behavior and congressional activity.
I. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION AND DISPARATE TREATMENT
This Part discusses the Court's recognition of the value of
speaker neutrality in First Amendment law, particularly in the recent
decisions in Citizens United v. FEC and Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc. It
then sketches some of the problematic disparate treatment in the
Copyright Act, and addresses some less-feasible solutions to the
problem before introducing the potential of institutional tailoring
driven by Progress Clause values.
15. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. Equal Emp't Opportunity
Comm'n, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706 (2012); Zoe Robinson, What is a "Religious Institution'?, 55 B.C. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2014).
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A. The Trouble with Speaker-Based Distinctions
The First Amendment proclaims that "Congress shall make no
law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."'16 That
pronouncement is not as absolute as a simple textual analysis would
indicate. 17 While restrictions on some "well-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech ...have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem,"'18  the Court applies some level of
constitutional scrutiny to the regulation of protectable speech. 19 In
particular, the Court discourages inequitable, speaker-based
abridgments of free speech. It has repeatedly held that restrictions
that discriminate against or favor certain groups of speakers and not
others are unconstitutional.20 This is due in part to the potential of
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
17. See, e.g., Members of the City Council of City of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789, 808 (1984) ('The incidental restriction on expression which results from the City's
attempt to [reduce visual clutter] is considered justified as a reasonable regulation of the time,
place, or manner of expression if it is narrowly tailored to serve that interest." (citing Heffron v.
Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 61, 68-71 (1981); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S.
455, 470-71 (1980); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115-17 (1972); Police Dep't of Chi.
V. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98 (1972))). Note that an absolutist view of the First Amendment is likely
unworkable, and would render unconstitutional "all of contract law, most of antitrust law, and
much of criminal law." Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three
Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 270 (1981). The same would likely be true if an absolutist view were
applied to copyright law. But see, e.g., DAVID L. LANGE & H. JEFFERSON POWELL, No LAW:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT 2 (2009) (arguing
that a correct interpretation of the First Amendment would make unconstitutional the grant of
an exclusive right in the reproduction of expression).
18. Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) ('There are certain
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which
have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem."); United States v. Stevens, 559
U.S. 460, 478 (2010) ("From 1791 to the present... the First Amendment has permitted
restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas, and has never included a freedom
to disregard these traditional limitations." (internal quotations and alterations omitted) (quoting
R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992))); see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49
(1969) (incitement); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957) (obscenity); Chaplinsky, 315
U.S. at 572 (fighting words).
19. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2737 (2011) (noting that a
state law restricting the sale of violent video games to minors "is invalid unless [the state] can
demonstrate that [the law] passes strict scrutiny" (citing R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 395)); Turner Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 661-62 (1994) (applying intermediate scrutiny to content-neutral
regulation of cable providers).
20. Often, when the Court addresses constitutionally problematic disparities in the law,
it applies the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Police Dep't of the City of Chi. v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 96 (1972) ("[UInder the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the First Amendment
itself, government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable,
but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial views."). This Article
instead considers the Court's rationale for a speaker-neutral First Amendment. See also Jeffrey
M. Blum, The Divisible First Amendment: A Critical Functionalist Approach to Freedom of
Speech and Electoral Campaign Spending, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1329 (1983) ("[C]ourts [are
required] with certain subject matter exceptions, to be strictly neutral with regard to a speaker's
538
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speaker-based restrictions on speech to slide into content-based or
viewpoint-based discrimination,21 which are also disfavored forms of
speech restrictions.
22
The Court first articulated a principle of speaker neutrality in
Police Department v. Mosley.23  In Mosley, the Court held
unconstitutional the city of Chicago's regulation that banned picketing
in front of schools during school hours, except for "peaceful picketing
of any school involved in a labor dispute."24 In finding the picketing
ban unconstitutional, the Court closely connected the barred
speaker-based distinction with invidious content-based distinctions
designed to keep certain topics out of the public forum.
25
Mosley was a watershed case because it was the first time the
Court had described First Amendment protections in terms of
equality.26  Cases following Mosley clarified how discrimination
against groups of speakers could be problematic, even without an
invidious underlying content- or viewpoint-based goal. 27 The Court
identity and message in determining whether behavior satisfies the disruptive potential test.");
Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20,
26-29 (1975); Schauer, Principles, supra note 12, at 98-99 (noting that in the typical government
enterprise cases, the concern is not access, but discriminatory treatment, and concluding that
"content-based discriminatory treatment is appropriate in some [First Amendment] contexts but
not in others"); Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has
in Common with Anti-Pornography Law, Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications
Regulations, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1, 63 (2000) ('Various aspects of First Amendment law are
structured to minimize disparate effects on identifiable groups").
21. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 678 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 189, 249 (1987) [hereinafter Stone, Content Regulation].
22. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 396 (holding unconstitutional a prohibition on
"bias-motivated" fighting words because it was viewpoint based, even though a viewpoint neutral
prohibition on those words would be valid because the fighting words themselves are not
protected speech).
23. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 100; see also Karst, supra note 20, at 26-27, discussed in
Geoffrey R. Stone, Kenneth Karst's Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 75 U.
CHI. L. REV. 37, 37-39 (2008) (noting that, after Mosley, if the government "allow[s] more speech
than it is constitutionally required to allow, the government creates an inequality that cases like
Schacht [v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970)] and Mosley hold must be independently justified").
24. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 92-93.
25. See id. at 100.
26. See Karst, supra note 20, at 28. In the words of Justice Marshall's majority opinion,
which blended equal protection and First Amendment analysis, "the crucial question is whether
there is an appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered by the differential treatment."
Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95 (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-77 (1971); Weber v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972)). Justice
Marshall went on to note that "the First Amendment means that the government has no power
to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Id.
(citations omitted).
27. See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 194
(1999) ("[Government] decisions that select among speakers conveying virtually identical
messages are in serious tension with the principles undergirding the First Amendment." (citing
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invalidated bans on political speech by banks and corporations, 28
struck down regulations that distinguished among media companies, 29
and rejected rules that prevent government employees from receiving
an honorarium for speaking, teaching, or writing articles on topics not
related to their employment. 30
While there were indications that the Court was backing away
from a speaker-neutral First Amendment in cases like Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,31 the Court recently took a sharp
turn back toward the principle of a speaker-neutral First Amendment.
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the Court
invalidated a ban on election advertising by corporations. 32 The Court
concluded that Congress could not constitutionally treat corporations
differently than other speakers. 33 Doing so would "tak[e] the right to
speak from some and giv[e] it to others . . . depriv[ing] the
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465 (1980); First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777,
784-85 (1978))).
28. First Nat'l Bank of Bos., 435 U.S. at 793; see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010); infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
29. Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 229 (1987) (noting that a tax
could not constitutionally target "a small group within the press," even though it did not target
particular viewpoints); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 585, 592 (1983) (holding unconstitutional a tax that targeted the largest not only publishers
for taxation). But see Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991). In Leathers, the Court held that
a sales tax on cable television (and later) satellite services that exempted newspapers and
magazines did not violate the First Amendment. In distinguishing Arkansas Writers' and
Minneapolis Star, the Court concluded the tax in Leathers was acceptable precisely because it
targeted an entire media branch-cable operators (and later, satellite operators)-and not a
smaller subset of a particular media branch. Id. at 447-48. The Court in Leathers tried
unsuccessfully to recast both earlier cases as rejecting "a tax scheme that targets a small number
of speakers" as dangerous because such a tax "runs the risk of affecting only a limited range of
views," id. at 448, 453, but there was, however, nothing content- or viewpoint-based about the
taxes rejected in Minneapolis Star or Arkansas Writers'.
30. United States v. Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 468-70 (1995)
(concluding the regulation, while neither content- nor viewpoint-based, nevertheless "impose[d] a
significant burden on expressive activity" by the employees, and "on the public's right to read
and hear what the employees would otherwise have written and said").
31. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622 (1994). Scholars initially hailed
Turner as a vanguard of a new era, moving away from the principle of speaker neutrality. See,
e.g., Erik Forde Ugland, Cable Television, New Technologies and the First Amendment After
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 60 MO. L. REV. 799, 831 (1995) ("After Turner, it is
no longer certain that regulations targeting particular media or organizations will be found
unconstitutional.").
32. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 318 (2010) (overruling
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1989)).
33. Id. at 349 ("If the antidistortion rationale [propounded in an earlier case] were to be
accepted, however, it would permit Government to ban political speech simply because the
speaker is an association that has taken on the corporate form."); see also James Ianelli,
Noncitizens and Citizens United, 56 Loy. L. REV. 869, 885-86 (2010) ("[T]he Court [in Citizens
United) showed that a principal concern with speaker-based restrictions is that they deprive
citizens of their right to hear from certain subsets of speakers .... ").
540
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disadvantaged person or class of the right to use speech to strive to
establish worth, standing, and respect for the speaker's voice.' 134 In
his concurrence in Citizens United, Justice Scalia reiterated that the
First Amendment "is written in terms of 'speech,' not speakers. Its
text offers no foothold for excluding any category of speaker .. .
Speaker-based preferences in the marketplace of ideas present
a variety of problems. They can distort public debate.3 6 They may be
motivated by the impermissible but not readily apparent goal of
enacting content- or viewpoint-based restrictions on speech. 37
Speaker-based preferences might also produce disparate effects whose
restrictive impact can be difficult to measure in some cases. 38 The
imposition of speaker-based regulation might indicate either that a
stated government interest motivating the speech restriction is
somewhat exaggerated, 39 or that Congress has failed to take into
account the broader effects a certain benefit will have on
nonbenefitted speakers. 40 The state may even silence speakers when
it denies benefits to those who speak out in certain ways but grants
34. Citizens United, 558 U. S. at 341 ("The Government may not by these means deprive
the public of the right and privilege to determine for itself what speech and speakers are worthy
of consideration."); see also id. at 394 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
('"The basic premise underlying the Court's ruling is its iteration, and constant reiteration, of the
proposition that the First Amendment bars regulatory distinctions based on a speaker's identity,
including its 'identity' as a corporation.").
35. Id. at 392-93 (Scalia, J., concurring); but see id. at 420-21 (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("[1]n a variety of contexts, we have held that speech can be
regulated differentially on account of the speaker's identity, when identity is understood in
categorical or institutional terms. The Government routinely places special restrictions on the
speech rights of students, prisoners, members of the Armed Forces, foreigners, and its own
employees. When such restrictions are justified by a legitimate governmental interest, they do
not necessarily raise constitutional problems." (citations omitted)).
36. Turner, 512 U.S. at 676 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Laws that treat all speakers
equally are relatively poor tools for controlling public debate, and their very generality creates a
substantial political check that prevents them from being unduly burdensome. Laws that single
out particular speakers are substantially more dangerous, even when they do not draw explicit
content distinctions." (citing Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460
U.S. 575, 584, 591-92 (1983); Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991)).
37. See Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive
in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 454 (1996) ("So long as a content-neutral
law has differential effects on particular ideas-even assuming those effects are widely
dispersed-it may bear the taint of improper motive.").
38. See Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 21, at 218.
39. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending
Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2423 (1996) (defining copyright law as a "content-based
restrictiono on high-value speech imposed by the government acting as sovereign").
40. See Netanel, First Amendment Skein, supra note 4, at 59, 62.
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those same benefits to those who remain silent or advocate in a
different way.
41
Speaker-based tailoring can easily slide into viewpoint-based
tailoring, especially when the identified group benefitting from or
restricted by the tailoring holds certain views in common. For
example, if Congress passes a law that abridges the ability of
identified members of the Tea Party to gather in public places, it
might indicate that those in political opposition to the Tea Party, or
those who disagree with ideas typically associated with the Tea Party,
were attempting to silence dissenting views. On the other hand, a law
that provides extra privileges to members of the Tea Party might raise
the specter of legislative capture that can also distort speech by
granting disparate access.
42
While it might be tempting to limit strict scrutiny of
speaker-based tailoring to political activity in light of the focus in
Citizens United on election advertising, the Court also recently applied
it to speaker-based restrictions on commercial speech. In Sorrell v.
IMS Health, the Court applied heightened scrutiny to strike down a
regulation barring the sale of information about doctors' habits in
prescribing medicines to pharmaceutical detailers. 43 Justice Kennedy,
writing for the Court, noted that the law contained a content-based
restriction that disfavored marketing.44 But Justice Kennedy also
expressed concern about the law's speaker-based effects, independent
of content. 4' For example, under one provision of the statute at issue
41. But see Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the
Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 96 (1988) (refuting that argument as presented by
striking union workers in Lyng v. Int'l Union, UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 369 (1988)).
42. But see Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87,
101-02 (1982) (holding campaign disclosure requirements could not be applied to the Socialist
Workers Party because such disclosure would expose Party members to harassment, threats and
reprisals); Geoffrey R. Stone & William P. Marshall, Brown v. Socialist Workers: Inequality as a
Command of the First Amendment, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 583, 583 (querying whether the "First
Amendment compel[s] the government to exempt particular speakers from an otherwise
constitutional law of general application").
43. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663 (2011).
44. Id. at 2663-64.
45. See id. at 2667 (comparing Vermont's bar on selling information to detailers to a
hypothetical statute, based on Minneapolis Star, that would prohibit "trade magazines from
purchasing or using ink"); see also Marcias M. Boumil, Pharmaceutical Gift Laws and
Commercial Speech Under the First Amendment in the Wake of Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 8 J.
HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 133, 161 (2012) ('The regulation was . . . speaker-based because it
allowed purchase and use by some recipients (such as researchers and public health
professionals) but not others (specifically pharmaceutical companies and their marketing
departments).").
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in Sorrell, pharmacies could sell prescribing information to private or
academic researchers, but not to pharmaceutical marketers.
46
The decisions in Citizens United and Sorrell signal a
continuing commitment by the Court to a speaker-neutral First
Amendment in both the political and commercial arenas.47 As
identified in the next subpart, the Copyright Act as currently
constituted manifests substantial institutional tailoring. 48 Under the
Court's speaker-neutral interpretation of the Speech Clause, much of
this tailoring appears unconstitutional.
B. Constitutional Implications of Copyright Tailoring
The Copyright Act boasts provisions that provide specific
advantages-and disadvantages-to different institutions or interest
groups. For example, Congress restored copyright protection to works
that had fallen out of protection in the United States because of a
failure to observe certain formalities.49 This restoration is available
for works created or initially owned by foreign residents or
domiciliaries, but not residents of the United States.50 In addition, the
owner of the copyright in a musical composition holds an exclusive
right to publicly perform the work-and therefore license that right to
others-while the owner of copyright in a sound recording has only the
more limited right to perform publicly the work through digital audio
transmission. 51 Thus, terrestrial radio stations (i.e., over-the-air or
broadcast stations) must pay for the right to broadcast musical
compositions, but not the sound recordings embodying those
compositions. 52 Cable and satellite radio stations and Internet radio
stations both must pay a compulsory license rate for the right to
broadcast the sound recording as well. While cable and satellite radio
46. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2662-63 (noting that the regulation was content-based,
and "[miore than that, the statute disfavors specific speakers, namely pharmaceutical
manufacturers").
47. The Court in Sorrell tried to cast its rejection of this regulation as consistent with
what it continues to construe as a ban on laws that target a "narrow class" of speakers, like
Arkansas Writers' and Minneapolis Star. See id. at 2668 (noting that a ban on the speech of
pharmaceutical companies throughout the state is more reminiscent of the tax held
constitutional in Leathers that targets whole industries like cable operators without taxing other
media industries, like newspaper and magazine publishers); see also supra note 29 (describing
how the Court unsuccessfully attempted to distinguish Leathers from the earlier precedents);
DiCola, supra note 11 at 1886. Thus, like Citizens United, Sorrell signals a strong shift away
from the speaker-based tailoring tolerated in Leathers.
48. See infra Part I.B.
49. See infra Part III.B.
50. 17 U.S.C. § 104(A)(g) (2012).
51. Compare id. § 106(4), with id. § 106(6).
52. See infra Part III.C.
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stations pay a relatively low license rate, Internet radio stations pay a
much higher rate.
53
Defenses or exceptions to the reach of an author's exclusive
right are also often institution-specific. Libraries and archives benefit
from specific exceptions to the copyright owner's exclusive right to
reproduce the work.54 Likewise, veterans' organizations and nonprofit
fraternal organizations can include performances of nondramatic
literary or musical compositions in their social functions, so long as
they donate any profits to charity.
55
Disparities like those mentioned above might give little cause
for alarm, if not for the capacity of the copyright system to chill
desirable expression.56 Copyright protection is economic regulation, a
limited monopoly that gives authors and owners of copyrighted
expression exclusive rights to make or authorize public performance or
display of the expression, 57 as well as exclusive rights to copy,
distribute, or make new adaptations of copyrighted expression. 58
Exercising these rights without the permission of the copyright owner
can trigger both criminal and civil liability,5 9 and statutory damages
for civil infringement can reach $150,000 per work infringed.60
Additionally, courts frequently grant preliminary and permanent
injunctions against unauthorized users, 61 even though the Court
generally considers speech-restricting preliminary injunctions
unconstitutional "prior restraints."6 2  Thus, granting copyright
53. See infra Part III.C.
54. 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2012).
55. Id. § 110(10) (specifically excluding college fraternities and sororities).
56. See, e.g., Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression
Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work's 'Total Concept and Feel', 38 EMORY L.J. 393, 423-33
(1989).
57. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4)-(6) (2012).
58. Id. § 106(1)-(3).
59. Id. § 501 (violating the rights under § 106 infringes copyright protection, and
subjects the violator to civil remedies under 17 U.S.C. §§ 502-505); id. § 506 (criminalizing
willful copyright infringement).
60. Id. § 504(c) (describing statutory damages as a remedy for copyright infringement).
61. See id. § 502; see also Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and
Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 165 (1998); Volokh, supra note 39,
at 2459.
62. The fact that private actors bring copyright complaints does not bar the application
of First Amendment scrutiny on the ground that the First Amendment does not apply to private
individuals. If the application of the remedies of copyright protection restricts First Amendment
freedoms, the action of the courts is the action of the federal government. For example, the Court
held, in Cohen v. Cowles Media, that the First Amendment would apply to a state court's
enforcement of a promissory estoppel claim, because promissory estoppel is a state-law doctrine
creating legal obligations never explicitly assumed by the parties, but enforceable through the
official power of the state's courts. See Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663, 668 (1991).
Likewise, in New York Times v. Sullivan, the Court held that a civil lawsuit between private
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protection to the author of an expressive work allows the author to
restrict subsequent uses of the work.
63
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the speech-restrictive
potential of copyright protection in articulating its rationale for not
applying heightened First Amendment scrutiny in two recent cases
that challenged amendments to the Copyright Act. 64 In Eldred v.
Ashcroft, the Court rebuffed a challenge to a twenty-year extension to
the term of copyright protection, concluding it was unnecessary to
apply searching First Amendment review. 65 The Court supported its
conclusion by focusing on the two "traditional contours" of copyright
law encoded in the Copyright Act-the idea-expression dichotomy that
prevents Congress from extending copyright protection to ideas,6 6 and
the fair use defense, which allows some uses of protected works
without securing the author's permission or paying the author a
royalty.6 7 The Court noted that Congressional action that altered
parties could impose invalid restrictions on the First Amendment freedoms of one of the parties.
See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964). While the Court has not explicitly
addressed it, the exercise of federal power pursuant to the Copyright Act that allows a copyright
owner to bring a private action in federal court and secure an injunction against otherwise
protectable behavior would also amount to state action, and potentially trigger First Amendment
protections. David McGowan argues that the First Amendment provides no justification for
dealing with disputes between authors. David McGowan, Why the First Amendment Cannot
Dictate Copyright Policy, 65 U. PTT. L. REV. 281, 285 (2004). But when Congress sets baseline
rules that preference one institutional group over another, it is troubling to conclude that the
playing field has been leveled in a way that satisfies speaker-neutral First Amendment
restrictions on government activity.
63. See L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 4
n.12 (1987) (allowing the author "to control access to the copyrighted work" once it is published
"is the essence of censorship").
64. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Melville B. Nimmer Memorial Lecture, UCLA School of
Law, First Amendment Constraints on Copyright After Golan v. Holder, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1082,
1086 (2013) [hereinafter Netanel, Constraints After Golan].
65. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-20 (2003) ("[C]opyright law contains built-in
First Amendment accommodations" allowing free use of ideas and providing a fair use defense,
which "affords considerable 'latitude for scholarship and comment"') (citing and quoting Harper
& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985)). Both the idea-expression
dichotomy and the fair use provision are also described as implementations of Progress Clause
values. See Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The
Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119,
1166 (2000); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 305 (1988);
Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1602 (1982).
66. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012); Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890 (2012); Feist
Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991) (copyright assures authors
the right to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and
information conveyed by their work).
67. The fair use defense is codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). See also Golan, 132 S. Ct.
at 890.
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those traditional contours would trigger First Amendment scrutiny. 68
In Golan v. Holder, the Court rejected another First Amendment
challenge to a statute that restored copyright protection to the works
of foreign authors that had fallen into the public domain, on the
ground that Congress left "undisturbed the 'idea/expression'
distinction and the 'fair use' defense. 69
Thus, the Court expressly recognized two elements of the
Copyright Act that may not be altered without triggering First
Amendment scrutiny. Additionally, scholars and jurists argue that
the Copyright Act is properly subject to more fulsome First
Amendment constraints.70 In light of the potential chilling effects of
copyright protection, it is puzzling that the Copyright Act-filled to
the brim with rights that certain groups of copyright owners but not
others can exercise, limitations on the rights of a subset of copyright
owners that do not fall upon the majority, and defenses accessible only
by certain institutional groups-is treated by the Court as consistent
with First Amendment values as articulated in cases like Citizens
United and Mosley.
If the Copyright Act has speech-restricting effects, 71 one might
wonder how courts should apply First Amendment standards to
evaluate this speaker-based institutional tailoring. If the First
Amendment provides any substantive limitations on the scope of
granted copyright protection, can it tolerate the systematic disparity
in speaker-based grants of both exclusive rights and defenses against
those rights? One potentially drastic response is "No." If the Court
cannot permit Congress to restrict political advertising by
corporations, may it allow Congress to restore copyright protection to
the authors and owners of foreign works whose works fell out of
68. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221. See also Netanel, Constraints After Golan, supra note 64, at
1086.
69. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890-91.
70. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 908 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that speech related
harms caused by restoring copyright protection to works by foreign authors "show the presence of
a First Amendment interest" sufficiently important "to require courts to scrutinize with some
care the reasons claimed to justify the Act in order to determine whether they constitute
reasonable copyright-related justifications for the serious harms, including speech-related
harms, which the Act seems likely to impose."); Eldred, 537 U.S. at 266 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the extension of copyright protection would cause "serious expression-related
harm" without any "benefit [to] the public"); Lemley & Volokh, supra note 61, at 169 (citing
Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70
VA. L. REV. 53 (1984)).
71. See Edward Lee, Technological Fair Use, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 813 (2010);
Sigmund Timberg, A Modernized Fair Use Code for the Electronic as Well as the Gutenberg Age,
75 Nw. U. L. REV. 193, 229 (1980); see also Eldred, 537 U.S. at 266 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(observing that the scope of Congress's legislative power must be discerned by reading the
Copyright Clause "in light of the First Amendment").
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protection because of a failure to observe now-invalid formalities,
while denying that restoration to authors and owners of works created
by American domiciliaries? 72 If the Court applied strict scrutiny to
every speaker-based inequality in the Copyright Act, there would be
little Copyright Act left.
One might also argue that copyrighted expression and its
alleged infringement are sufficiently distant from the core of First
Amendment values that any potential slippage from speaker-based to
content- or viewpoint-based effects is inconsequential. 73  That
argument is problematic for at least two reasons. First, from 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island to Sorrell v. IMS, the Court has
collapsed the boundaries between commercial and political speech.
74
Second, sometimes the most effective political speech is grounded
upon commercially valuable copyrighted expression. For example,
Alice Randall appropriated the characters of Margaret Mitchell's Gone
with the Wind in her novel The Wind Done Gone, which cast as heroes
the slaves on Mitchell's fictional plantations.7 5 By criticizing a book
that romanticizes the antebellum South, Randall challenged America's
racist past.7 6 Her goal was simultaneously political and expressive.
77
Granting authors like Mitchell the ability to silence critiques like The
72. This Article does not address the major differential treatment in the Copyright Act,
which grants the author the exclusive right to copy, adapt, distribute, publicly perform, and
publicly display the work, while the public may generally copy, adapt, distribute, publicly
perform, or publicly display a copyrighted work only when the author grants permission. There
is also a difference, here, between statutory grants and exceptions, which are the subject of this
article, and fair use, which is not. Fair use is the backstop to every exclusive right granted by the
Copyright Act, but when one starts from a position where one activity falls outside the copyright
grant, and the other doesn't unless a fair use defense applies, the first activity will occur more
often, and be subject to less potential chilling than the latter.
73. See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar,
Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 814-16 (1999) (arguing that an intratextual analysis of
constitutional text would properly limit the First Amendment injunction that Congress shall
make no laws abridging freedom of speech to Congressional action that restricts political
discourse).
74. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 484 (1996); see, e.g., Fazal
Khan & Justin Holloway, Verify, Then Trust: How to Legalize Off-Label Drug Marketing, 117
PENN ST. L. REV. 407, 439 (2012) ("[Ilt appears [in light of Citizens United and Sorrell] that the
Court is fundamentally rethinking the lower level of protection afforded to commercial speech
under Central Hudson.").
75. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
76. See, e.g., David Roh, Two Copyright Case Studies from a Literary Perspective, 22 L.
& LIT. 110 (2010).
77. As Henry Louis Gates stated in support of Randall, The Wind Done Gone
"constitutes both an original work of art and a moving act of political commentary,
deconstructing as it does a text that many scholars believe to be racist." Declaration of Henry
Louis Gates, Jr. 7, Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga.
2001) (No. 1:01-CV-701-CAP), available at http://www.houghtonmifflinbooks.com/features/
randall-url/pdf/DeclarationHenryLouisGates.pdf.
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Wind Done Gone would reduce access to viewpoints unpopular to
copyright owners, some of which will be as close to the core of political
speech as electioneering.
78
It might be sensible to try to avoid constitutional questions
entirely, and some institutional tailoring is justified under traditional
economic rationales.79  For instance, Joseph Liu notes that the
increasingly complex institutional tailoring in the Copyright Act
indicates that Congress is intervening "more substantially into the
nature and structure of copyright markets, as opposed to leaving these
details to the market."80  Michael Carroll argues the economic case
that uniform protection for copyrights is often inefficient,
necessitating some type of differentiation among copyright owners to
reduce uniformity costs.8 '
While neither Liu nor Carroll tackle the First Amendment
implications of industry-specific copyright law, they acknowledge that
different institutional groups in the copyright can require different
levels of protection.8 2 Such differential treatment may provide better
clarity, at least for those regulated parties.8 3 It may also cure market
failures and bring relative parties to the bargaining table with each
other, or members of Congress.
8 4
Complexity presents downsides, however, including increased
statutory complexity, decreased transparency, increased lobbying,8 5
and perhaps too much deference to a Congress that is too busy
fund-raising to take seriously its role as a constitutional gatekeeper.8 6
As Neil Netanel and Jessica Litman have argued, certain interest
groups can regularly and reliably turn to Congress for special
benefits.87 Congress's expansion of protections under the Copyright
78. Cf. Niels B. Schaumann, An Artist's Privilege, 15 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 249,
253 (1997) ("Tyrannical governments have long attempted either to suppress art or to channel it
into politically correct themes and statements.").
79. Economic theory is frequently used to critique or justify the scope of copyright
protection. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003).
80. Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 105 (2004).
81. See Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework for Tailoring
Intellectual Property Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 1389-94 (2009).
82. See Liu, supra note 80, at 153; Carroll, supra note 81, at 1364.
83. See Liu, supra note 80, at 134.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See generally LARRY LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: How MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS -
AND A PLAN TO STOP IT (2011); Oliar, supra note 2, at 1830 (noting the Court's review in Eldred
was "characterized by substantial deference to Congress's subjective judgment").
87. See Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 857, 869-79 (1987) [hereinafter Litman, Compromise]; Netanel, First
Amendment Skein, supra note 4, at 67.
548 [Vol. 16:3:533
20141 THE INSTITUTIONAL PROGRESS CLAUSE 549
Act has inspired criticism that industries that benefit from broad
copyright protections have captured the legislative body.88 It may
thus be reasonable, in light of that dynamic, to distrust any
manifestation of disparate treatment in the language of the Copyright
Act.89 While there are reasonable arguments in favor of institutional
tailoring on economic grounds, 90 constitutional values are sufficiently
important that economic rationales alone cannot justify the
institutional tailoring in the Copyright Act. 91
While the Court has resisted speaker-based tailoring in its
Speech Clause jurisprudence, there may be justifications for
preferential treatment grounded in other constitutional provisions.
For example, in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Court recently held
that the Free Expression Clause of the First Amendment extends
"special solicitude" to the rights of religious institutions. 92 The Court's
holding in Hosanna-Tabor failed to define religious institutions,
leaving scholars the challenge of creating a framework for
determining which religious institutions qualify for that special
solicitude.93 This Article undertakes a similar goal in the copyright
context, identifying characteristics that institutions particularly
deserving of solicitude under the Progress Clause may possess.
88. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 20, at 67 (arguing that in setting the threshold for
Congressional activity that affects speech, "if the standard is too low, interest groups may
capture the legislature and overprotect some speech at the expense of other speech," which
Tushnet argues happened during the recent extensions of copyright protection).
89. See, e.g., CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT
RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 134-35 (2012) ("Even when
legislators are dedicated to service the public interest, much of the information they receive
comes from interest groups seeking to maximize their own welfare."); Mark A. Lemley, The
Constitutionalization of Technology Law, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 529, 532 (2000) ("Congress in
recent years seems to have abdicated its role in setting intellectual property policy to the private
interests who appear before it.").
90. See, e.g., Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the
Best Incentive System, 2 INNOVATION POL'Y & THE ECONOMY 51, 71 (2002). Scholars have also
noted that the institutional tailoring in the Copyright Act may better assign rights ex ante to the
parties best able to exploit them, see Carroll, supra note 81, at 1361, 1364, or increase clarity for
regulated parties. See Liu, supra note 80, at 134. While economic analysis generally does not
consider constitutional limits on institutional tailoring, it does suggest that not all instances of
institutional tailoring lead to pernicious effects, or necessarily stem from misguided goals.
91. Cf. Reece v. Gragg, 650 F. Supp. 1297, 1303 (D. Kan. 1986) ("[The] economic motive
[of stretching inadequate prison resources] is an impermissible justification for the resulting
constitutional violations.").
92. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n
132 S. Ct. 694, 704 (2012); see also generally Robinson, supra note 15.
93. Id.; see also infra Part III.A.
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II. PROGRESS CLAUSE VALUES
As discussed above, speaker-based tailoring of speech
protections has met with a chilly reception in the Supreme Court.94
However, such disparate treatment may nevertheless be
constitutionally permissible, so long as Congress picks the right
institutions for favorable treatment. Constitutional scholars have
argued that courts should handle First Amendment inquiries along
institutional lines by identifying institutions that promote speech
values or externalize valuable speech in their typical operations and
ensuring that Congress does not abridge the ability of those
institutions to contribute to our general speech infrastructure.
95
Advocates for institutional tailoring of the First Amendment
suggest that these lines should be drawn to favor "group[s] or
organization[s] whose recognized function [is] to obtain information
for the purpose of public dissemination. '" 96 Thus, an institutionally
driven First Amendment regime would best promote speech values if
courts could clearly identify institutions that serve as "repositor[ies]
for certain constitutionally important values" and the extent to which
"protecting those institutions would have the tendency to serve those
values."97 Well-drawn institutional lines could provide safe harbors
against chilling valuable speech provided or intermediated by those
institutional actors who can rely on their preferred First Amendment
status. 98 That in turn could allow courts to decide some cases earlier,
potentially lowering litigation costs for First Amendment
institutions.99  It might also make courts more sensitive and
responsive to the context in which public discourse occurs.1 00
94. See supra Part I.A.
95. See generally HORWITZ, supra note 9; Schauer, Categories, supra note 12. Schauer
suggests that these institutions will merit First Amendment solicitude because of characteristics
that are "prelegal" or "extralegal," existing regardless of legal rules. Id. at 1748-49.
96. Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information:
Towards a Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249,
350-51 (2004) (suggesting that journalists, academic or scientific researchers employed by
universities or the government, and researchers employed by public policy groups or think tanks
would qualify).
97. Schauer, Categories, supra note 12, at 1764. Paul Horwitz argues that First
Amendment institutions are institutions which occupy a stable, central place in public discourse,
and that engage in self-regulatory practices that arguably merit deference from courts. See
HORWITZ, supra note 9, at 15; Horwitz, Grutter's, supra note 12, at 589.
98. See e.g., Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 1256, 1268 & n.63 (2005) [hereinafter Schaeur, Towards] ("[Ain institutional account of the
First Amendment might yield more of a genuine privilege (that is, immunity from an otherwise
applicable requirement, analogous to a reporter's privilege) of academic freedom than now exists
in current doctrine.").
99. See id.
100. See HORWITZ, supra note 9, at 92.
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While the Court to date has not embraced special treatment of
institutions under the Speech or Press Clauses, it has applied a
ministerial exception, drawn from the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment, to insulate the hiring
decisions of religious institutions from governmental regulation. 101
While extending these privileges to religious institutions can run
counter to principles of speech neutrality, 10 2 the decision to do so is
grounded in other constitutional values co-equal with the
speaker-neutrality principle drawn from the Speech Clause.
Core principles can be similarly drawn from the text and
history of the Progress Clause, 10 3 which can aid in identifying
institutions that might reasonably merit preferential treatment.
Indeed, the Progress Clause grants Congress specific authority subject
to substantive limits, both in its requirement that exclusive rights last
for limited times and its overarching purpose that exclusive rights are
secured to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." 10 4 The
Progress Clause rests on three overlapping values-incentivizing
creation and dissemination, expanding knowledge, and providing
public access. "Progress institutions" that externalize these values
may merit particularly solicitous treatment under the Copyright
Act. 105
A. The Progress Clause as a Substantive Limit on Congressional
Authority
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution-which includes the
Progress Clause-spells out the enumerated powers of Congress and
provides it with the authority to enact laws "necessary and proper" to
exercise those powers. 106 Congress's core regulatory power stems from
the Commerce Clause.107 The Progress Clause provides Congress with
a specific-but limited-power to craft protection for copyrighted
expression and patented inventions. Specifically, it authorizes
Congress "[tlo promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
101. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Equal Emp't Opportunity
Comm'n 132 S. Ct. 694, 704 (2012).
102. Cf. Micah Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351,
1353 (2012) (noting that the Government argued in Hosanna-Tabor "that religious groups are
not entitled to protections beyond those available to nonreligious expressive associations under
the Free Speech Clause").
103. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
104. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see infra Part II.A.
105. See infra Parts II.B.-II.D.
106. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
107. Id. cl. 3.
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securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 108
Some scholars, like Professor Nimmer, have argued that the
"progress" phrase is merely a preamble that provides no substantive
limit on congressional authority. 10 9 Others, like Thomas Nachbar,
have argued instead that the progress requirement is too ambiguous
to justify judicial intervention, 10 or that the concept of progress denies
definition and thus provides courts with too little guidance to overturn
congressional regulation in the intellectual property space.1 '
It is, however, the work of courts to provide meaning for
ambiguous or uncertain constitutional language." 2 Arguing that the
Progress Clause provides no substantive limit is problematic precisely
because such an argument ignores the unique structure of the
Intellectual Property Clause. That structure makes the clause the
sole Article I, Section 8 power that describes a particular means to
accomplish its particular end: promoting progress through an
exclusive grant to authors and inventors." 3 Likewise, to construe the
"progress" phrase as merely preambular makes a nullity of
constitutional language. Reading the progress requirement out of the
Clause thus runs afoul of the principles of constitutional
interpretation that the Court employs.1 14
108. Id. cl. 8.
109. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A]
(Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed.) ("[Tjhe phrase 'To promote the progress of science and useful arts ...'
must be read as largely in the nature of a preamble, indicating the purpose of the power but not
in limitation of its exercise."').
110. See Thomas B. Nachbar, Judicial Review and the Quest to Keep Copyright Pure, 2 J.
ON TELECOM & HIGH TECH L. 33, 55 (2003) (arguing that calls to treat the public choice problems
in creating copyright law as unique are a misguided attempt to "respond to a problem with
representative government by discarding it").
111. See id. at 67 ("Application of the Progress Phrase involves a nested imponderable:
Not only is the net effect on progress of virtually any change in the copyright law imponderable,
but the very nature of progress is itself imponderable.").
112. See e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522, 528 (1972) (noting the difficulty in
defining or construing the boundaries of the right to a speedy trial, but nevertheless providing a
test for assessing the point at which the right to a speedy trial must be asserted or waived).
113. Compare Nachbar, supra note 110, at 55 ("Other than an awkwardly worded clause
in the Constitution to provide a textual hook, what makes copyright so special?"), with Edward
C. Walterscheid, The Preambular Argument: The Dubious Premise of Eldred v. Ashcroft, 44
IDEA 331, 378 (2004) ("If the words of Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison have any
meaning, then the phrase 'To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts' in the Science and
Useful Arts Clause cannot be merely a meaningless preamble." (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. 137, 176 (1803) ('The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that these
limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the constitution is written."))).
114. See, e.g., Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 381 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Sentelle, J., dissenting)
("The clause is not an open grant of power to secure exclusive rights. It is a grant of a power to
promote progress."); see also Heald & Sherry, supra note 65, at 1160-66 (arguing that limitations
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More critically, one must understand what the Intellectual
Property Clause empowers Congress to do. Compare the Intellectual
Property Clause with the Commerce Clause. The Commerce Clause of
Section 8 grants Congress power "to regulate Commerce." 115  The
power granted under the Intellectual Property Clause is not the power
to secure an exclusive right to authors and inventors, 1 6 but the power
"[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.11 7 And the
power to promote the progress of science is by definition narrower
than the power to regulate commerce.118
One might accept the limiting function of the Progress Clause
and still be concerned about the difficulties posed by institutional
line-drawing regimes more generally. Like other line-drawing or
rule-creating regimes, an institutional framework could be both
over- and underinclusive. Some members of an institutional group
might fall short in externalizing constitutional values.11 9 Likewise,
some actors that externalize constitutional values might be left
without certain privileges because they cannot be slotted into a
particular institutional frame.
1 20
In addition, to the extent institutional line drawing requires
identifying an "existing social institution" with "moderately
on Congressional activities taken pursuant to its respective Section 8 enumerated powers must
be grounded in the justification for that power).
115. U.S. CONST art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
116. Id. cl. 8.
117. Id. But see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST
PERIOD, 1789-1801, at 93 (1997) (arguing that the Intellectual Property Clause does not confer
"a general power to 'promote the progress of science and the useful arts,' but only the power to
grant limited exclusive rights in order to accomplish that goal").
118. See e.g., Oliar, supra note 2, at 1844 ("[T]he 'progress' language in the Clause
provides a textual basis for the negation of the implication that
the power to 'promote' progress implies the grant of power to 'retard' progress of arts and
sciences."); see also Jake Linford, A Second Look at the Right of First Publication, 58 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 585, 595-604 (2011) [hereinafter Linford, First Publication] (critiquing
the Court's limited view of the Progress Clause requirement).
119. Cf. Joshua G. Hazan, Note, Stop Being Evil: A Proposal for Unbiased Google Search,
111 MICH. L. REV. 789, 792, 819 (arguing that while Google "spearheaded the net neutrality
movement," its own behavior "has begun to threaten the very openness and diversity it once
championed").
120. See, e.g., Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025, 1058-
60 (2011) (noting that accepting special protection for an institutional press might leave some
actors without Press Clause protections, but arguing the Speech Clause provides a sufficient
backstop to minimize the concern); see also HORWITZ, supra note 9, at 168-69 (arguing that
instead of expanding the definition of institutional press to include bloggers, we "should define
blogs' institutional autonomy in a way that is appropriate to [their] unique institutional features
and practices"); RonNell Andersen Jones, Litigation, Legislation, and Democracy in a
Post-Newspaper America, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 557, 612 (2011) (arguing that even if
disaggregated media entities can provide the public with news, those entities "are unlikely to
take on all of the roles [like litigating to shape and enforce free speech law] that newspapers once
unitarily played in American society.").
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. [Vol. 16:3:533
identifiable" boundaries, 121  it is important to recognize those
identifiable boundaries may be due as much to legal structures as any
prelegal reality. 122 For example, Aereo offers subscribers access to a
remote antenna that captures broadcast signals and reroutes them to
the subscriber's compatible device for viewing. 123 The Supreme Court
has granted certiorari and will soon determine whether Aereo's
services violate a provision of the Copyright Act.' 24 The particular
structure of Aereo's features, however, appear to have been made to
qualify for a safe harbor from copyright liability carved out for a
similar service by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, Inc. 125 The development
of Aereo's business mode seems to be driven as much by legal
constraints as by technological capacity or consumer need.126
It is true that an institutional review framework cannot catch
every problematic change in the Copyright Act. 27 In some cases,
institutional or speaker-based tailoring might be preferable than some
speaker-neutral provisions of the Copyright Act.128 Finally, there is at
least some danger that a line-drawing regime based on institutions
could make the wrong determination and create bright lines within
121. Schauer, Towards, supra note 98, at 1275.
122. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
123. About Aereo, AEREO, https://aereo.com/about (last visited Feb. 27, 2014).
124. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. granted sub nom.
Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 896 (2014) (No. 13-461) (mem.).
125. See The Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 139-40 (2d
Cir. 2008).
126. James Grimmelmann, Copyright Arbitrage in Action, THE LABORATORIUM (Mar. 4,
2012, 1:00 PM), http://laboratorium.net/archive/2012/03/04/copyright arbitragein-action.
127. The Work Made For Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000 included a
"housekeeping" amendment that added sound recordings to the list of works that could be works
made for hire, even though the author was not an employee. This change would have hamstrung
efforts by recording artists to terminate transfers of copyrighted works to record labels. Mary
LaFrance, Authorship and Termination Rights in Sound Recordings, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 375, 410
(2002). The amendment was considered problematic at the time, and almost immediately
repealed, but it would not have triggered heightened constitutional scrutiny under the
institutional review framework proposed by this Article.
128. For example, the Copyright Term Extension Act, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 302(a)-(c)
[hereinafter CTEA], added twenty years to the term of both existing works and works not yet
created. See generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). Some critics argued that disparate
treatment was more consistent with progress or speech values than uniformity, and uniform
extension of the copyright term was the signal that something was rotten in the CTEA. See, e.g.,
Brief of Amici Curiae George A. Akerlof et al. at 15, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No.
01-618) ("Comparing the main economic benefits and costs of the CTEA, it is difficult to
understand [copyright] term extension for both existing and new works as an
efficiency-enhancing measure.").
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which "courts allow heavy speech restrictions and defer to government
officials."1
29
But while the institutional framework is no panacea for all that
ails copyright law, it is nevertheless a clear step in the right direction.
As this Article details more fully in Part IV, the application of some
level of searching review would kick-start a more productive
conversation about the values our copyright policy should embody.130
In addition, evaluating the preferential treatment in the Copyright
Act with an eye to locating progress institutions will lead to copyright
laws more in harmony with their constitutional justification.
The remainder of this Part discusses three overlapping
goals-incentivizing creation and dissemination, expanding
knowledge, and providing public access-that copyright protection
must serve if it is to meet the agenda set by the Framers in the
Progress Clause. 131  And just as certain institutions may be
particularly well-suited to promote the values underlying the Speech
Clauses, some institutions, in their typical operation, are well-placed
to promote the fundamental purposes of the Progress Clause. 132 Those
three core values drawn from the text and the historical context of the
Progress Clause provide some indication of institutions that might
merit special solicitude because, in their typical operation, they
provide public benefits commensurate with one or more of these
values. 1
33
B. Promoting Progress by Incentivizing Creation and Dissemination
The exclusive right Congress grants to authors is often
described as public facing, i.e., "the ultimate aim" of allowing an
author to "secure a fair return" on her "creative labor" is "to stimulate
artistic creativity for the general public good." 134  As reported by
Edward Walterscheid, the Framers saw Congress's authority to
129. Scott Moss, Students and Workers and Prisoners-Oh, My! A Cautionary Note About
Excessive Institutional Tailoring of First Amendment Doctrine, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1635 1658-59
(2007) (finding that relative to three institutions-public schools, workplaces, and prisons-
institutional line drawing has led to problematic heightened deference).
130. See infra Part IV.
131. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use Markets: On Weighing Potential License Fees,
79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1814, 1856, n.118 (2011) [hereinafter Gordon, License Fees] (noting that
even if "Progress" is left undefined, one can make "preliminary assessments" about whether
potential changes to the Act are consistent with the Progress clause); see also Oliar, supra note 2,
at 1836 ("Progress,' of course, is not a clearly defined concept. It would not be straightforward,
and it would perhaps even be difficult, for courts to determine which grants of intellectual
property rights 'promote 0 progress."').
132. See infra Part II.E.
133. See infra Part I.E.
134. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
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promote progress as a narrow power, limited to securing an exclusive
right to authors and inventors in their writings and discoveries.1 35 For
example, James Madison was convinced that Congress perceived itself
as tied down: "to the single mode of encouraging inventions by
granting the exclusive benefit of them for a limited time." 136  This
relatively narrow reading suggests that Congress was empowered to
provide for the public good in the copyright context by providing a
means to incentivize creative labor through profitable dissemination.
Seeking "the promotion of progress" through a grant of exclusive
rights to authors is consistent both with the prehistory of the Progress
Clause and what little we can glean from the Constitutional
Convention and contemporary sources about its adoption.
The historical antecedents of the Constitution and the first
federal copyright act in the United States illustrate the Framer's view
that an exclusive right-and the profit it secures-was designed to
motivate creative expression. 37 The Statute of Anne, England's first
copyright act, was ostensibly crafted "for the encouragement of
learning" by preventing the printing of books "without the consent of
135. See, e.g., Edward C. Walterscheid, Conforming the General Welfare Clause and the
Intellectual Property Clause, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 87, 104-05 (1999) [hereinafter Walterscheid,
General Welfare]; see also Jeanne C. Fromer The Intellectual Property Clause's External
Limitations, 61 DUKE L.J. 1329, 1332 (2012) (arguing that both the textual structure and
historical application of the Intellectual Property Clause bars Congress from using means other
than securing an exclusive right to others and inventors to promote the specified end of
promoting the progress of science and useful arts). But see Walterscheid, General Welfare, supra,
at 102-03 (arguing that Alexander Hamilton may have had the better of the argument that
Congress had the power, pursuant to the General Welfare Clause, to pay directly for research
and development); Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts:
The Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution,
2 J. INTELL PROP. L. 1, 32-33 (1994) ("The Clause was intended not so much as an express
authority to promote the progress of science and the useful arts, but rather as a means of
ensuring authority to do so in a particular way .... ").
136. See Letter from Tench Coxe to James Madison (Mar. 21, 1790), in 13 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON, 128 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1981).
137. See e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 ('The
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an author's creative labor. But
the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good."
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp., 422 U.S. at 156));
Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) "[Clopyright law
celebrates the profit motive, recognizing that the incentive to profit from the exploitation of
copyrights will redound to the public benefit by resulting in the proliferation of knowledge....
The profit motive is the engine that ensures the progress of science."); Bruce Abramson,
Promoting Innovation in the Software Industry: A First Principles Approach to Intellectual
Property Reform, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 75, 93-94 (2002) ("Most people looking for an
investment venue will choose to put their time, effort, and/or capital into tangible property that
can be resold at a personal profit rather than into ideas that will benefit society at large but
whose promised personal returns are limited .... IP rights thus represent a societal attempt to
harness the profit motive in order to motivate innovation."); Zi Wong, The Experimental Stage
Doctrine: The Quiet Death of an Experimental Use Heresy, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
691, 692 (2000).
556 [Vol. 16:3:533
THE INSTITUTIONAL PROGRESS CLAUSE
the authors or proprietors."138 In other words, Britain would promote
knowledge by using exclusive rights to "encourage ... learned men to
compose and write useful books."
139
The committee of the Continental Congress in charge of
suggesting what type of copyright protection states might reasonably
grant instead embraced a natural rights rationale. 140 The committee
concluded that "nothing is more properly a man's own than the fruit of
his study." But as often occurs, the natural rights rationale bled into
utilitarian goals.141 The committee noted that "the protection and
security of literary property would greatly tend to encourage genius
[and] to promote useful discoveries." 142  And those states that
extended copyright protection to their citizens primarily modeled their
statutes on the Statute of Anne, which ostensibly protected the
author's profit incentive rather than an identity-based moral right.143
Some of the proffered language, however, reflected a Lockean concept
of natural rights.
144
The limited historical record from the Constitutional
Convention suggests that the Framers were convinced that there was
138. The Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). For a more detailed discussion of the
relationship between authors and stationers in the period leading up to the passage of the
Statute of Anne and its subsequent enforcement, see Linford, First Publication, supra note 118,
at 635.
139. The Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
140. The historical record suggests that the Committee took testimony only from
authors, which may make this an early example of successful interest group lobbying to secure
copyright protection. But see Robert C. Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for
the Protection of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 516, 519-20 (1981) ("Notions of a
natural right to the fruit of one's labor, and of the injustice of the enrichment that falls to the
taker are as much a part of copyright as the careful balancing of incentive and dissemination.").
141. See 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 211 (entry for May 2, 1783).
142. See id. at 326-27, cited by Malla Pollack, What is Congress Supposed to Promote?:
Defining "Progress" in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, or
Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754, 783-84, n.147 (2001).
143. See, e.g., L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Copyright in 1791: An Essay Concerning
the Founders' View of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of
the U.S. Constitution, 52 EMORY L.J. 909, 933 n.61 (2003) ("The state statutes were directed at
the protection of authors' profits, rather than any moral rights she or he might have. The author,
while the focus of the statutes, could pass the right to profit by publishing and vending to heirs
or assigns.").
144. See, e.g., ACTS AND LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 236 (Boston
1781-1783):
Whereas the Improvement of Knowledge, the Progress of Civilization, the public Weal
of the Community, and the Advancement of Human Happiness, greatly depend of the
Efforts of learned and ingenious Persons in the various Arts and Sciences: As the
principal Encouragement such Persons can have to make great and beneficial
Exertions of this Nature must exist in the legal Security of the Fruits of their Study
and Industry to themselves; and as such Security is one of the natural Rights of all
Men, there being no Property more peculiarly a Man's own than that which is
produced by the Labour of his Mind.
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a relationship between the grant of an exclusive right and the
stimulation of desired output. In addition to the language of the
Progress Clause, the Constitutional Convention contemplated direct
subsidies to universities or artists. 145 For example, the Convention
considered empowering Congress to "establish a University," or
"establish seminaries for the promotion of literature and the arts and
sciences.'146 Those direct subsidies were ultimately not included in
the Progress Clause,' 47 an omission that was likely intentional.' 48
There are no records about why the Constitutional Convention
selected the language chosen, but James Madison embraced individual
protection of copyrighted expression as necessary for the public
good.' 49 Madison asserted, "the public good fully coincides.., with the
claims of individuals."' 50 And in one public essay, Madison equated
control over one's thoughts as a property right in the same way that
control over one's real estate was a property right-both necessary for
a properly functioning government. 151  Finally, when the first
Congress passed the Copyright Act of 1790, the Act looked much like
the aforementioned Statute of Anne-"[a]n Act for the encouragement
of learning," accomplished "by securing the copies of maps, charts, and
books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times
therein mentioned.' 52
This rough glimpse of the historical background of the
Framers' views gives .some general guidance regarding the "progress
of science and useful arts" that copyright protection must promote. As
Dotan Oliar has noted, the decision to limit Congressional scope to
securing exclusive rights to authors and inventors was most likely
intentional. 153 Jeanne Fromer has concluded that Congress may not
promote progress in any way other than securing exclusive rights to
145. See Oliar, supra note 2, at 1777.
146. See e.g., id. at 1789.
147. Id. at 1792-93 (noting that Congress rejected President Washington's call to
establish a university, and proposing that the decision not to include the power to establish a
university meant the Framers intended not to provide that power).
148. Id. at 1792.
149. THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961).
150. Id. at 272. But see Tom W. Bell, Escape from Copyright: Market Success vs.
Statutory Failure in the Protection of Expressive Works, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 771 (2001)
(arguing that Madison misunderstood or misrepresented English precedent of the day, and that
Madison did not embrace a natural rights justification for copyright protection).
151. James Madison, Property, in 1 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION Ch. 16, Doc. 23 (2000)
(originally dated Mar. 29, 1792) ("[A] man has a property in his opinions and the free
communication of them."), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/
vlchl6s23.html.
152. Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124.
153. See supra notes 146-148 and accompanying text.
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authors. 15 4  Given the centrality of the exclusive right to the
constitutional text, for progress to have meaning in light of that text,
it must be progress that can be promoted by securing exclusive rights
for authors to their writings. The Progress Clause, and the Copyright
Act enacted to accomplish its goals, envisioned an exclusive right to
incentivize the creation and distribution of new expression. 155 The
author is not rewarded in the abstract for her efforts but for her
creative output-and even then only to the extent she can find a
(paying) audience receptive to it.156 Exclusive rights of some sort must
therefore be a part of the US copyright system. To conclude otherwise
would do considerable harm to the constitutional language.
C. Promoting Progress by Expanding Knowledge
The Progress Clause is also boundary defining. The accepted
wisdom is that it protects only two distinct types of addition to human
knowledge: inventions, which receive patent protection, and writings,
which receive copyright protection. 157 The category of writings that
qualify for protection today is much broader than those protected by
the Copyright Act of 1790.158 Nevertheless, the Progress Clause builds
in a natural limit recognized by the courts, as articulated in the
idea-expression dichotomy. 159  Some things fall outside of both
copyright and patent protection, and are free for all to use.
160
Congress may not grant perpetual protection, so that the authors'
writings are eventually released to the public.' 6 ' The public can freely
154. See Fromer, supra note 135 at 1332 (arguing that "[tihe IP Clause's text and
placement within the constitutional structure suggest that Congress" may only promote progress
by "securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries" and may promote progress by no other means).
155. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) ("By
establishing a marketable right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic
incentive to create and disseminate ideas.").
156. See id.
157. See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 887-88 (2012) ("Perhaps counterintuitively
for the contemporary reader, Congress' copyright authority is tied to the progress of science; its
patent authority, to the progress of the useful arts."); In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94
(1879) (holding that federal trademark protection cannot be justified under the Progress Clause
because unlike copyright or patent protection, securing trademark rights does not "depend upon
novelty, invention, discovery," but only upon "priority of appropriation").
158. Compare, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012), with Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124.
159. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 105-06 (1879); see also supra note 41 and
accompanying text.
160. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to
Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 294 (1996) (defining the public
domain as "the works and uses that are free for all to use").
161. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003)
(noting that Congress may not "create 0 a species of perpetual patent [or] copyright").
2014] 559
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
exploit, reproduce, and resell works for which protection has expired
at their marginal cost of reproduction.
162
Through both its subject matter limitations and the grant of an
exclusive right only for limited times, the Progress Clause provides a
substrate of freely accessible material on which any person can build
his or her own creative expression or novel invention. 163  This
substrate, often called "the public domain," is comprised of
information that once was protected as intellectual property and
information that may never be protected as intellectual property. 164
While this description might suggest that the public domain is an
essential part of the constitutional scheme outlined in the Progress
Clause, the Supreme Court in Golan v. Holder indicated that the
concept of a public domain held little constitutiorial significance.1 65
As discussed above, the Progress Clause's statutory
predecessors provided an exclusive right to authors and inventors, in
part to increase the available store of knowledge.' 66 Founding-era
state copyright statutes expressed goals like "the improvement of
knowledge, the progress of civilization, and the advancement of
human happiness."1 6  Promoting the progress of science and useful
arts might thus be effectively reducible to "encouragement of
learning."168
The Supreme Court has articulated a fairly low Constitutional
threshold for "creative" or "original" expression, 6 9  and thus,
162. This marginal cost nears zero in the Internet age.
163. See Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
347, 368 (2005); Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright and Misappropriation, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 885,
887 (1992) ("Because knowledge, technology, and culture advance by building on an existing
base, too much protection for particular works can inhibit social progress rather than enhance it.
One object of the game, at least insofar as it is based on incentive theories, is to determine where
the protective lines are optimally drawn.").
164. See, e.g., Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991)
("Facts, whether alone or as part of a compilation, are not original and therefore may not be
copyrighted.").
165. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888 n.26 (2012) (dismissing the argument that
copyright legislation that restores protection to works in the public domain must also provide
new incentives to create, "[e]ven assuming the public domain were a category of constitutional
significance"); see also Lyle Denniston, From Plyler v. Doe to Trayvon Martin: Toward Closing
the Open Society, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1799, 1815 (2012) ("[T]he Supreme Court essentially
destroyed-at least in constitutional terms-the concept of a 'public domain."').
166. See supra notes 137-142 and accompanying text; see also BOHANNAN &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 89, at ix (defining "innovation" as "any human idea that adds something
important to what we already have").
167. See Oliar, supra note 2, at 1807.
168. See Lawrence Solum, Congress's Power to Promote the Progress of Science: Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 45 (2002).
169. See, e.g., Feist, 499 U.S. at 362 ("The standard of originality is low, but it does
exist.").
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increasing creative expression is not necessarily the same thing as
increasing knowledge. 170  Scholars disagree whether the Progress
Clause requires an increase in quality of the knowledge base,171 a
numerical increase in new inputs into the knowledge base, 172 or the
value of the knowledge base judged economically, 173 but many argue
that copyright protection is justified only when the protection results
in an advance in knowledge, however defined.
174
In fact, the Progress Clause's discernable focus on increasing
knowledge has led some scholars to question whether the Framers
would have been interested in the creation of the entertainment tent
poles that currently drive much of Congress's legislative agenda with
regard to copyright protection. 175 An increase in knowledge, properly
defined, may be limited to an increase in things that are inherently
valuable. 176  Under this view, copyright protection for books as
artifacts that promote the progress of science might be overinclusive if
it protects copyrights in trashy literature, but would nevertheless be
justifiable so long as an increase of knowledge was the end goal, not
just a side benefit. 177 There is danger, however, in trying to protect
only works of a certain artistic or cultural value. 178 While many
scholars recognize the importance of the collective increase in
knowledge, some suggest that intellectual property protection was
always too blunt a policy instrument to promote "innovation and
cultural progress."'
179
Despite the challenge of such line drawing, as Justin Hughes
has identified, it is not far a stretch to conclude the "primary objective
170. Cf. Ned Snow, The Meaning of Science in the Copyright Clause, 2013 BYU L. REV.
259 (arguing that "Science," as used in the Progress Clause, means a system of knowledge
comprising distinct branches of study, and in light of that meaning, Congress may not be
empowered to extend copyright protection to expression that the First Amendment does not
protect).
171. See Fromer, supra note 135, at 1374 (stating that a law promotes progress "if it
seeks to encourage advancement in areas of systematic knowledge, including cultural knowledge
or technology."); Solum, supra note 168, at 57 (proposing that the question to ask, before any
statute is enacted is whether it will "encourage systematic knowledge and learning of enduring
value?").
172. See Heald & Sherry, supra note 65, at 1163.
173. Compare Fromer, supra note 135, at 1373, with Pollack, supra note 143, at 756. But
see Heald & Sherry, supra note 65, at 1163 (noting that the "quid pro quo" principle they locate
in the constitutional text "does not authorize a court to invalidate legislation simply because it
does not increase wealth").
174. See e.g., Oliar, supra note 2, at 1801 n.191.
175. See Solum, Power, supra note 168, at 54.
176. See Snow, supra note 170, at 264.
177. See, e.g., Solum, Power, supra note 168, at 57-59.
178. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Corp., 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
179. See Carroll, supra note 81, at 1361.
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of intellectual property" is "to 'promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts' by increasing society's stock of knowledge."180 Institutions
that play a central role in cataloging and categorizing that stock of
knowledge, broadly defined, might therefore merit special solicitude.
D. Promoting Progress by Providing Access
The Supreme Court has stated that ensuring access to
copyrighted expression is the primary goal of copyright protection.
181
Some scholars suggest that the access aspect of the Progress Clause
requires maximizing the broadest possible dissemination of
copyrightable expression.182 Under that definition, any change in
copyright protection would be merited only to the extent that it
"increase[s] public access to writings."18 3  But a commitment to
dissemination does not necessarily require early or permanent
absorption of a work into the public domain, so long as there is
relatively affordable access for the public during the term of copyright
protection. Often, the owner of the work will offer different versions of
a work, or in different formats, at different price points over time.
18 4
For example, publishers sell both hardback and paperback versions of
the same book at different times,18 5 catching more price-sensitive
purchasers with the more affordable paperback copy, which is released
later than the hardback version.186 Libraries purchase copies that are
lent to patrons at no cost, and publishers take the phenomenon into
account when pricing volumes. 8 7 Note that this price discrimination
across versions can facilitate the production of public goods.188 Indeed,
180. Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 295 (1988).
181. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); see also
supra note 134 and accompanying text.
182. See Pollack, supra note 142, at 760.
183. Id. at 766.
184. See Linford, First Publication, supra note 118, at 635.
185. See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 288 F.3d 1028, 1031 (7th
Cir. 2002) (Posner, J).
186. See Julie Bosman, Paperback Publishers Quicken Their Pace, N.Y. TIMES, July 26,
2011 (reporting that publishers had shortened the delay in releasing paperback editions from
one year to six months in response to pressure created by the availability of e-book editions).
187. See Linford, First Publication, supra note 118, at 639.
188. See, e.g., John P. Conley & Christopher S. Yoo, Nonrivalry and Price Discrimination
in Copyright Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1801, 1810-11 (2009) (describing how public goods
tend to be underprovided in the absence of price discrimination because the rational user will
underreport the utility she derives from a public good, and thus the provider of a public good
may underestimate its value (citing Paul A. Samuelson, Aspects of Public Expenditure Theories,
40 REV. ECON. & STAT. 332, 334-36 (1958))); see also In re Brand Name, 288 F.3d at 1031 ("The
publishing industry is extremely competitive but, as just noted, price discrimination is the norm
in it.").
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if the commitment to free access trumps the ability of copyright
owners to charge a desired price for their expression, some potential
authors will be dissuaded from spending the time to create new
expression. 189
Accessibility does not require a copyrighted work to be free. 190
The Progress Clause provides for two types of public access: paid
access-guaranteed by the exclusive right secured to the author-and
access through the public domain once a work crosses the threshold of
limited times. 191 While copyright protection subsists, the copyright
owner can withhold access to the work unless the public pays for it.192
Engaging in certain uses of the work without the copyright owner's
authorization will infringe the owner's exclusive right.193 In that case,
the owner can seek monetary and injunctive relief,194 while the state
may bring criminal charges. 195 It is the author's ability to determine
the price of the work that provides the reward. The more a given
member of the public values a given work, the higher the price she
will be willing to pay to consume it.196 Once the work falls out of
copyright protection (or if some information never qualifies for
protection in the first instance), anyone can utilize the work in any
way, free of cost.
197
The limited term of protection provides for a second type of
public access. Once the work is in the public domain, the public can
189. See, e.g., Cake: Flying High After a Record Low, NPR Music (Mar. 3, 2011, 4:59
PM), http://www.npr.org/2011/03/03/134233768/cake-tk (quoting John McCrea, lead singer and
songwriter for Cake, who stated "I see music as a really great hobby for most people in five or
[ten] years," with "everybody I know, some of them really important artists, studying how to do
other jobs").
190. See e.g., Conley & Yoo, supra note 188, at 1805 (arguing that the standard economic
analysis that pits incentives for efficient creation against efficient access might be misguided);
Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 ORE. L. REV. 19, 32-33
(1996) ("Public access is surely not necessary to the progress of science.... If we measure the
progress of science by the profits of scientists, secrecy may greatly enhance the achievements we
find.").
191. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
192. See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 893 (2012) (requiring would-be users to pay for
access to a work did not deprive them of access to that work).
193. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
194. Id. §§ 501-505.
195. Id. § 506.
196. See, e.g., Conley & Yoo, supra note 188, at 1809-10 ("Although every consumer
necessarily consumes [the same quantity of a copyrighted work], different consumers may derive
different levels of utility from doing so ... and can only signal the intensity of their preferences
by paying different prices.").
197. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964) ("[When an
article is unprotected by a patent or a copyright[, for state law to] forbid copying would interfere
with the federal policy, found in Art. I, [§] 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution and in the implementing
federal statutes, of allowing free access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws
leave in the public domain.").
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use the work for free. Distributors, no longer required to meet the
copyright owner's price, can reproduce and distribute the work for the
marginal cost of production. 198
We can interlace the three progress values identified above to
suggest two types of institutional actors that might merit Progress
Clause solicitude. Because promoting progress means providing
access to copyrighted expression, there exist two broad categories of
access intermediaries, and it may be justifiable for Congress to treat
institutions with those characteristics favorably.
The first type of institutional actor is a collection intermediary,
like a library or a university that serves as a repository for expression.
These institutions can fulfill the access-promoting function in different
ways. Some, like public libraries, might use funds from the state to
acquire a cache of materials that the public can used at little or no
cost.199 Others, like private universities, might also cache materials,
with access reserved for tuition paying students or fee-paying
members. 200  In either case, the institution would serve as an
intermediary-purchasing works and making them available to the
public (or at least the portion of the public that subsidizes the private
library).2 1 These actors would simultaneously provide incentive,
knowledge, and access benefits to the public.
The second category of access intermediaries is distribution
intermediaries, who lower the cost of distributing or publishing
copyrighted works.202 Historically, copyrighted works did not reach
the public without the movie industry, publishers, and record labels to
move physical copies. 20 3 Indeed, it is possible that the copyright
system as it exists today is optimized to incentivize the efforts of
198. See Jon M. Garon, Normative Copyright: A Conceptual Framework for Copyright
Philosophy and Ethics, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1278, 1318 (2003).
199. Cf. C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891,
918 (2002). State funded libraries by their nature are funded with taxes. Cf. Federal Funding,
AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION, http://www.ala.org/advocacy/libfunding/fed (last visited Feb.
28, 2014).
200. Cf. Werner Cohn, Private Stacks, Public Funding, 24 No. 2 AM. LIBRARIES 182-84
(Feb. 1993), available at http://wernercohn.com[Libraries.html. The materials selected by these
institutions might look somewhat different than those selected by public libraries. Id.
201. See Trivits v. Wilmington Inst., 417 F. Supp. 160, 163-64 (D. Del. 1976) (noting the
different tax status of free and private subscription libraries under Delaware law).
202. See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the
New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 311 (2002) (noting that among
other virtues, "the Internet and digital technology ... reduce the transaction costs associated
with connecting artists to the public").
203. Jessica Litman, War and Peace: The 34th Annual Donald C. Brace Lecture, 53 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 1, 11 (2006) (conceding that at least until the Internet enabled
distribution without a significant capital investment, "profit-making intermediaries, who
understandably need[ed] a business model calculated to produce profits . . . [were] absolutely
necessary parties in the distribution chain").
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distributors, not creators.20 4 One might therefore reasonably question
whether it makes sense to craft copyright legislation at the request of,
or with the goal of protecting, such institutions.2 05 While some
scholars have criticized the central role of middlemen and aggregators
in the content industries, others have noted that, despite these flaws,
some works still require significant precreation funding and
centralized postcreation distribution, which these intermediaries
provide. 206
Internet providers can also serve as distribution
intermediaries. 20 7 Recall that collection intermediaries generally pay
for a copy of a work and share it with customers. 208 In contrast, a
distribution intermediary provides means to move a copy of a work
from purchaser A to user B. 20 9 Section 512 of the Copyright Act is
designed to insulate Internet Service Providers (ISPs) from secondary
liability for copyright infringement, so long as they merely serve as
conduits between individuals and do not infringe copyright in the
work in their own right.
210
Some institutions might serve as collection and distribution
intermediaries, and might thus merit special solicitude. Peter Menell
argues, for example, that Congress should have stepped in early in the
Google Book Search litigation to provide a safe harbor for companies
working with libraries to scan their archives because of the
importance of "making the vast knowledge of the Internet," as well as
204. See generally Jonathan M. Barnett, Copyright without Creators, 9 REV. L. & ECON.
389 (2013) (arguing that even if copyright does not induce authors and artists to create, it may be
justified because it induces profit-motivated intermediaries to create).
205. See, e.g., John Quiggin & Dan Hunter, Money Ruins Everything, 30 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 203, 245 (2008) ("[H]ighly capitalized intermediaries are no longer necessary
for the creation, production, dissemination, and use of culturally significant content, and
copyright is no longer the only mechanism for ensuring that content moves from the author into
society.").
206. See Eric E. Johnson, Intellectual Property and the Incentive Fallacy, 39 FLA. ST. L.
REV. 623, 672-73 (2012) (creating some types of copyrighted expression like movies and
television programs still requires a significant capital investment and necessitates copyright
protection or some other mechanism to cover the costs of production and distribution).
207. Cf. Linford, First Publication, supra note 118, at 587.
208. Cf. Baker, supra note 199, at 918.
209. Cf. Linford, First Publication, supra note 118, at 587. Historically, distribution
channels moved unique copies of works from one location to another. See id. Digital distribution
through the Internet alters that dynamic by enabling the instantaneous distribution of multiple,
effectively perfect copies from a single original. See id.
210. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012); see also Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F.
Supp. 2d 627, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (finding that while the allegedly infringing cloud storage
service qualified for the § 512 safe harbor in many respects, the owner of the company was liable
for direct infringement).
2014] 565
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
the contents of library archives, accessible "to the public at large."211
There is a difference, however, between intermediaries who pay for
the material they redistribute and those who do not. For example,
under the current statutory regime, whether one has purchased or
merely leased a copy will determine the subsequent right to use the
copy. 212 Likewise, a library which purchases the copies it distributes
to the public might have a better claim to solicitude under the
Copyright Act than a business built on redistributing copies it
duplicates without compensating the copyright owner-unless
maximizing free access is the priority.
In conclusion, these rough guidelines suggest that we can
identify progress institutions that typically promote the values
embodied in the First Amendment or the Progress Clause. This
institutional framework can provide some assistance in determining
whether a given incident of institutional tailoring by Congress is in
harmony or conflict with Progress principles. For example, libraries
are institutions that provide access and catalog knowledge, in part by
making purchases of copyrighted works. Identifying progress
institutions is work that courts are particularly well suited to handle,
because it is the type of inquiry that builds on expertise developed in
making factual assessments in speech cases. 213 In addition, to the
extent that copyright legislation is subject to agency capture, 214 a
financially independent judiciary may also best ensure that the
requirements of the Progress Clause are met in regulation involving
copyrighted expression. 215 And it is a responsibility the Supreme
Court will soon need to undertake in the free exercise context in light
of Hosanna-Tabor.
21 6
211. Peter S. Menell, Knowledge Accessibility and Preservation Policy for the Digital Age,
44 HOUS. L. REV. 1013, 1018, 1046 (2007).
212. See Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Copyright Exhaustion and the Personal
Use Dilemma, 96 MINN. L. REV. 2067 (2012); Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital
Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 889, 910-11 (2011).
213. See, e.g., Note, Deference to Legislative Fact Determinations in First Amendment
Cases after Turner Broadcasting, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2319 (1998) (describing the "norm of
accuracy" which imposes a duty on appellate courts to conduct an independent review of fact
records developed by lower courts or administrative agencies).
214. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an
Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975) (citing George J. Stigler, The Theory
of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971)).
215. Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1151
(1991) (arguing that to the extent the focus of the First Amendment has "shifted to protection of
unpopular, minority speech," an insulated judiciary arguably best protects it).
216. See generally Robinson, supra note 15, at 181.
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III. IDENTIFYING PROGRESS CLAUSE INSTITUTIONS
The institutional review framework offers an opportunity to
focus on where Congress engages in overt and potentially problematic
tailoring. Law-making parties-defined broadly to include the
executive branch, the public, and the interests that typically lobby
Congress for copyright protection, in addition to courts and
Congress-should pay attention to the disparate treatment codified in
the Copyright Act. Disparate treatment is important precisely to the
extent that it signals something is amiss in the legislative process that
will lead to constitutionally unjustifiable results. That treatment may
indicate public-choice effects, but not all public choice effects are
pernicious.217  Under the interest-group account of public-choice
theory, statutory outcomes reflect the bargains struck by the groups
that lobby Congress. 218 Sometimes, Congress can reach the right
results through imperfect processes, particularly if there is an
equilibrium created by interest groups lobbying for mutually exclusive
desired outcomes. 219 Therefore, any solution must focus more on
problematic results than potentially flawed processes.
220
When institutional tailoring is apparent on the face of the
statute, the proper question is whether the disparity is justified on
progress grounds. When reviewing statutory language granting rights
or exceptions to rights to certain institutions, a court should ask: "if
we uphold this statute as constitutional, will the protection granted to
the particular institution support one or more of the values embodied
in the Progress Clause?" If not, i.e., if the group does not externalize
progress values in its typical operation, it is likely that Congress has
overstepped its authority under the Progress Clause in light of the
217. See, e.g., Brian Galle, The Role of Charity in a Federal System, 53 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 777, 804 (2012).
218. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an
Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975) (citing George J. Stigler, The Theory
of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971)).
219. See Galle, supra note 217, at 804. In addition, it has been noted that some lobbying
for targeted funds by groups that provide mixed goods, like education, can provide public benefits
like an increase in education overall. See id.
220. See id. This is a key difference between this Article's proposed intervention and the
one proposed by Neil Netanel. Professor Netanel is concerned with "highly organized, amply
funded, and politically influential speech industries," Netanel, supra note 4, at 65, and so his
proposal focuses on looking for evidence of interest-group capture of the drafting process, and
applying strict scrutiny to the resulting legislation. See id. at 77. Focusing on disparate
bargaining power cannot resolve every conflict. The Copyright Act of 1976 was primarily a
negotiation between interest groups, subsequently presented to Congress for its approval. It
seems difficult to say, for example, that the cable industries had less clout than broadcasters, or
publishers than the movie industry. See, e.g., Litman, Compromise, supra note 87, at 880-81.
What matters most is the fruit born by the negotiation, not the negotiation itself.
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chilling effect that copyright protection can have on speakers who
wish to make use of copyrighted expression. 221 Thus, the court should
hold the statute unconstitutional unless Congress has something akin
to "a compelling government interest" in treating the institution in
question differently from others and the tailoring is sufficiently
narrow to meet that purpose. 222 On the other hand, where the
institution externalizes progress values, a court can safely assume
that Congress has made its decision with an eye toward those
values-or at least got lucky-and rarely, if ever, should it upset the
statutory regime.
The institutional review framework also provides a structure
for analyzing flaws in a proposed law before enactment. Courts
engage only in ex post review; however, Congress and the President
can consider whether apparent disparities might signal Progress
Clause problems. Even if neither the legislative nor the executive
branch take the strictures of the Progress Clause seriously, it is
possible that the institutional review framework will trigger
bottom-up or crowd-sourced engagement with problematic legislative
enactments.
223
The Copyright Act contains pervasive institutional tailoring. 224
It would take volumes to analyze the entire act through the
institutional review framework. Instead, it is illustrative to consider a
handful of representative cases, suggesting potential revisions and
potential responses to recently proposed legislation.
A. "Easy" Cases
There are some relatively easy cases where Congress reached
the right result in favor of an institution that promotes speech and
progress values. For example, the institutional review framework
221. See, e.g., Yen, supra note 57, at 423-33.
222. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2543 (2012). This is the "strict
scrutiny" standard that the Supreme Court uses to describe the review it undertakes when
considering whether a content-based or viewpoint-based speech restriction violates the First
Amendment. See id. ("When content-based speech regulation is in question ... exacting scrutiny
is required."); see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 71
(1987) ("Laws having severe effects ordinarily trigger strict scrutiny; laws having significant
effects ordinarily trigger intermediate scrutiny; and laws having relatively modest effects
ordinarily trigger deferential scrutiny."). There is no reason to be particularly wedded to the
traditional categories. For the public and members of Congress, it will likely be easier to focus on
whether disparity is present, and whether the institution receiving preferential treatment is a
valuable link in our national speech or progress infrastructures. Given, however, that this Article
also aims to signal to courts when it is most useful to engage in a serious constitutional inquiry,
it can be helpful to couch the discussion in language with which the Court is familiar.
223. See infra Part IV.
224. See, e.g., Liu, supra note 80, at 105.
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suggests little cause for alarm in regard to the special defenses
afforded to libraries and archives under section 108 of the Copyright
Act.225  Section 108 gives libraries and archives fairly narrow
exceptions to the copyright owner's section 106(1) duplication and
section 106(3) distribution rights.226 The section also specifies when
and how many copies a library can make for archival purposes;
227
whether the library can disseminate digital works to its patrons and
how it must handle the dissemination; 228 and how a library is to deal
with the problem of "orphan works."
229
If constitutionally grounded solicitude toward an institution
should ever trump Congress's grant of exclusive rights to the author, a
library seems like the sort of institution that should get a pass.
23 0
Libraries have historically served as information nexuses for the
public to discover a broad swath of information at a low cost of entry.
Consider, for example, the New York Public Library, which aspires to
provide "true centers of educational innovation and service, vital
community hubs that provide far more than just free books and
materials" and "to clos[e] the digital divide" for New Yorkers without
personal internet access.23 1 The institution aspires to not only provide
access to copyrighted works, but also to contribute to the expansion
and refinement of knowledge by collecting and categorizing the
"distinct branches of study" that comprise some classical definitions of
science. 232  From a progress perspective, libraries are a primary
institution providing affordable public access to copyrighted works. 233
In addition, libraries are among the best customers for some classes of
authors and publishers. 234  They can also serve as public-use
intermediaries-disseminating information to the public by paying the
225. 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2012).
226. Id. § 108(a).
227. See, e.g., id. § 108(b) (allowing "three copies or phonorecords of an unpublished
work").
228. See, e.g., id. § 108(b)(2) (reproductions in digital format can be distributed or made
available to the public "outside the premises of the library or archives").
229. See, e.g., id. § 108(h). Orphan works are works "protected by copyright but whose
rights holders theoretically cannot be located." Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, No.
11-CV-6351, 2012 WL 4808939, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2012).
230. See Schauer, Principles, supra note 12, at 84; HORWITZ, supra note 9, at 205-09.
231. About The New York Public Library, NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY,
http://www.nypl.org/help/about-nypl (last visited Feb. 28, 2014).
232. See Snow, supra note 170, at 259.
233. See About The New York Public Library, supra note 231.
234. Cf. Aaron S. Edlin & D.L. Rubenfield, Exclusion or Efficient Pricing? The "Big Deal"
Bundling of Academic Journals, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 119, 125-26 (2004) (reporting that academic
journal prices have increased faster than inflation and that libraries have responded in part to
the pressure by cutting down on acquisitions of books and monographs).
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copyright owner's asking price so individual members of the public
need not do so.
23 5
It is possible, however, in our new world of costless digital
reproduction, that there is no real difference between libraries and
other sources of free copyrighted material, like a BitTorrent feed.
236
Online distributors of individually posted works copied by customers
have repeatedly been on the losing end of copyright litigation.237 But
the institutional library differs in part because "each geographically
located, paper-text library effectively serves a limited number of
people."238  Furthermore, libraries have a distinct editorial stance,
reflected in the works they purchase and provide to the public.239
Based on these distinctions, Congress can reasonably provide special
solicitude for libraries without running afoul of the speaker-neutrality
requirement of the Speech Clause because libraries are institutions
that externalize Progress Clause values.
On the other hand, Congress also makes some indefensible
missteps in its institutional tailoring. Section 110 provides exceptions
to one or more of the copyright owner's exclusive rights to several
groups that do not externalize progress values. 240  For example,
section 110(6) insulates governmental bodies or nonprofit agricultural
or horticultural organizations from liability for infringing
performances by concessionaires during "an annual agricultural or
horticultural fair exhibition."241  Similarly, section 110(10) insulates
nonprofit veterans' or fraternal organizations from liability for
unlicensed performances, so long as the performance is to members,
and not the general public, and so long as profits after reasonable
expenses are used "exclusively for charitable purposes."242 Congress
granted this additional protection to veterans' and fraternal
organizations notwithstanding section 110(4), which insulates
235. The ability of libraries to loan books to the public is protected in part by the first
sale right, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109, which allows purchasers of authorized copies to lend them
to others.
236. See Rebecca Tushnet, My Library: Copyright and the Role of Institutions in A
Peer-to-Peer World, 53 UCLA L. REV. 977, 986-87 (2006) (explaining that the differences "good"
libraries and "bad" file-sharers are fewer than one might first imagine).
237. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 918 (2005).
238. Baker, supra note 199, at 918.
239. See id.; see also Linford, First Publication, supra note 118, at 639-42 (describing the
differences between print and digital distribution of copyrighted works and their relative effects
on copyright owners in network theory terms).
240. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(6) (2012).
241. Id.
242. Id. § 110(10). This protection excludes college fraternities and sororities. Id.
570 [Vol. 16:3:533
THE INSTITUTIONAL PROGRESS CLA USE
charitable performances where the performers are not paid.24 3 As is
frequently the case, this particular provision came about as a direct
result of lobbying.
244
Special protections for veterans' and fraternal organizations
are indefensible from a progress perspective. While the Court has
correctly recognized that fraternal organizations can engage in
activity that has First Amendment value for its members, this is no
different than any other organizations. 245 These organizations do not
serve an access-promoting or knowledge-aggregating function, and
insulating them from the requirement to pay the price other citizens
pay to use copyrighted expression is not justifiable on the
exclusive-right axis. Thus, denying copyright owners the ability to
secure licenses for these public performances seems to reflect nothing
more than a successful lobbying effort benefitting veterans and
fraternal organizations. 246  Similarly, Congress should scrap the
specific exceptions extended to government organizations and county
fairs, as there is no progress justification for the preferential
treatment those institutions either. They serve neither access nor
knowledge aggregation functions. Thus, under the institutional
review framework this is an easy call. At first glance, it might seem
that the game is not worth the candle. It is perhaps unsurprising that
veterans' organizations have the ear of Congress, but the lack of
potential progress values to support the carve-out is indicative of a
problem that requires focused public attention. This is especially true
if we desire copyright protection to operate on something like an equal
playing field or desire the inequities to be constitutionally justifiable.
B. 104A Restoration of Foreign Works
Not every statute will be uniformly consistent or inconsistent
with the demands of proper institutional tailoring. For example,
applying the institutional tailoring framework shows that when
Congress passed the Uruguay Round Agreement Act (URAA) in 1994,
it engaged in both constitutional and unconstitutional tailoring. The
243. See id. § 110(4). Jon Garon argues instead that in the context of defenses, Congress
has the power to "play favorites," and as there is no economic justification for that favoritism,
concludes that the subsection 4 exception for charitable organizations and the subsection 5
exception for radio stations, id. at § 110(5), "can only be justified from the progress perspective."
Garon, supra note 198, at 1326.
244. See Jessica D. Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 ORE. L.
REV. 275, 313 n.210 (1989). See also generally Litman, Compromise, supra note 87, at 880.
245. See Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
246. See Alvin Deutsch, Politics and Poker-Music Faces the Odds, 34 J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'Y U.S.A. 38, 48-49 (1986) (arguing that the § 110(10) exception is evidence of "an erosion of
the rights of copyright proprietors").
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URAA, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 104A, restored copyright protection to
works for which protection had expired because the authors failed to
observe then-necessary formalities. 247 Only works by foreign authors
were eligible.248 The statute granted no restoration to works by US
authors.249
Congress passed the URAA ostensibly to meet international
intellectual property treaty obligations. 250  As Justice Ginsburg
recounted in Golan v. Holder, Congress was attempting to secure
extra copyright protection for American authors in foreign
jurisdictions by extending this protection to foreign authors here. 251
However, Congress did not use the least speech-restrictive means to
accomplish this goal.252 The dispute in Golan centered on whether the
First Amendment or the Progress Clause required such effort.253
Lawrence Golan and similarly situated plaintiffs had made
expressive use of some foreign works that had fallen out of protection
and would regain protection under the URAA. 254 Golan sued for
declaratory and injunctive relief on the grounds that the URAA
violated both the Progress and Speech Clauses. 255 After two rounds of
litigation in the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado and the Tenth Circuit, the Supreme Court ultimately
rejected Golan's claims.
25 6
247. 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2012). Failure to observe formalities like including a copyright
notice on the work no longer deprives a work of copyright protection. Id. § 408(a). Prior to 1989,
failing to observe proper formalities could result in a work falling out of copyright protection,
which happened to many foreign works restored under § 104A. See also Linford, First
Publication, supra note 118, at 606-07. The URAA also "restored" copyright protection to foreign
works that never qualified for protection in the first place either because the author's home
country did not have "copyright relations" with the United States, or because the work was a
sound recording fixed before 1972. See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 881-82 (2012); see also
Jake Linford, Trademark Owner as Adverse Possessor, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 703, 738-39
(2013) [hereinafter Linford, Adverse Possessor].
248. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(6) & (8) (2002).
249. Id.
250. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 879-81. But see id. at 911 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing
that Congress could have met its treaty obligations in a way that did not cause "so much damage
to public domain material"); Elizabeth Townsend Gard, In the Trenches with § 104A: An
Evaluation of the Parties' Arguments in Golan v. Holder as it Heads to the Supreme Court, 64
VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 199, 203-09 (Oct. 3, 2011).
251. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 878 ("Members of the Berne Union agree to treat authors
from other member countries as well as they treat their own." (citing Berne Convention, Sept. 9,
1886, as revised in Stockholm on July 14, 1967, Art. 1, 5(1), 828 U.N.T.S. 221, 225, 231-33)).
252. See id. at 911-12 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
253. See id. at 878.
254. See id. at 878; see also id. at 906 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
255. See Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1216 (D. Colo. 2004), affd sub nom.
Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007).
256. See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 883-84 (2012).
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The Supreme Court concluded that the restoration of copyright
protection to foreign works was not an unconstitutional violation of
the Progress Clause requirement that an exclusive right be for a
limited time.25 7 The First Amendment argument, however, was a
closer call. During the second round of litigation, the plaintiffs
convinced the District Court that Golan and his co-plaintiffs had
exercised their First Amendment rights by creating new expression
from then-unprotected works. 258 The Supreme Court rejected that
First Amendment argument as well, concluding that the expressive
use by Golan and his co-plaintiffs did not justify "exceptional First
Amendment solicitude" of their use or create an inviolable public
domain. 25
9
Scholars have criticized the Court's holding in Golan broadly
on both speech or progress grounds. 260 Applying the institutional
review framework allows us to focus solely on the statutory disparity
in the URAA that restores copyright protection to works by foreign
authors but not American authors. From a progress perspective,
foreign authors are not more deserving of profit from their work or
more dependent than US residents on the incentive effects
attributable to copyright protection. 26 1  The failure to restore
protection to works created by US authors might be justifiable,
however, if we could identify a public-access or knowledge-expansion
ground to leave US authors less protected. 262 If we assume that the
general American public has a limited understanding of foreign
languages, it is possible that progress for US citizens is optimized by
providing the broadest access to the most valuable knowledge in
257. See id. at 889.
258. See Golan v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1177 (D. Colo. 2009), rev'd, 609 F.3d
1076 (10th Cir. 2010), aff'd, 132 S.Ct. 873 (2012).
259. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 891-92 (2012).
260. See e.g., Fromer, supra note 135, at 1403-05 (concluding that the URAA might have
exceeded the authority granted under the Progress clause); Linford, Adverse Possessor, supra
note 247, at 738-39 (noting that Golan inverted the standard notion that the public domain is
the baseline over which copyright protection is imposed); Jessica W. Rice, Case Note, "The Devil
Take the Hindmost" Copyright's Freedom from Constitutional Constraints After Golan v. Holder,
161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 283, 298-300 (2013) (stating Golan "has issued so broad a license to
Congress that ostensibly there remain no principled constitutional safeguards against the public
domain's continued erosion."). But see Netanel, Constraints After Golan, supra note 64, at 1103
(arguing that although the opinion in Golan narrowly defines the traditional contours of
copyright protection, it nevertheless "fortifies and gives First Amendment import to the
idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use defense").
261. See, e.g., Rice, supra note 260, at 298-300.
262. See id.
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English.26 3 That would justify distinguishing between works based on
the language in which they were written, but not on the residency of
the author. 264 Many foreign residents also write or sing in English. 26 5
Other forms of copyrightable expression are not language dependent
at all.266 Thus, the disparity between foreign and domestic authors
under the URAA lacks a progress clause justification. 267
That is not to say that the Supreme Court would necessarily
recognize the constitutional implication of denying copyright
protection to some classes of speakers. Under the Copyright Act of
1790-the first federal copyright provision-no protection was
provided foreign authors. 268 The Court assumes the constitutionality
of laws enacted by the earliest Congresses because those legislative
bodies were comprised of the Framers who drafted the Constitution. 26 9
The URAA is, in some ways, the mirror image of the Copyright Act of
1790, protecting foreign works in disparate ways from domestic works
in an effort to secure protection for domestic works on foreign
shores. 270  Consistent with its general reliance on founding-era
statutes to illuminate the scope of constitutional restrictions, the
Court could conclude that extending different levels of protection to
foreign and domestic authors is standard-or at least one
permissible-operating procedure. 271 One could nevertheless be more
confident in the constitutionality of the result reached by Congress if
263. See Josh Hill, Watch Your Language! The Kansas Law Review Survey of
Official-English and English-Only Laws and Policies, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 669, 700-01, 703
(2009).
264. See id.
265. See Juan F. Perea, Killing Me Softly, with His Song: Anglocentrism and Celebrating
Nouveaux Latinas/os, 55 FLA. L. REV. 441, 442 (2003).
266. See Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15 § 1, 1 Stat. 124.
267. A broad construction of Congress's treaty powers might be seen to justify the URAA.
See, e.g., Shira Perlmutter, Participation in the International Copyright System as a Means to
Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 332 (2002) ("As a
practical matter, it would be virtually impossible for the United States to play a leadership role if
each individual element in each negotiation had to independently promote the progress of science
in order to make implementing legislation constitutional. And if the only way to promote the
progress of science were to provide incentives to create new works, we would lose all flexibility.").
But as Heald & Sherry have noted, the Supreme Court has recognized Constitutional limits on
Congress's treaty powers in the past, and a limitation grounded in the Progress Clause is equally
justified. Heald & Sherry, supra note 65, at 1181-83 (citing Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416
(1920)); see Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1957).
268. See Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15 § 1, 1 Stat. 124; see also Tyler T. Ochoa, Copyright
Protection for Works of Foreign Origin, 2 IUS GENTIUM, 167, 167-68 (2008).
269. See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 886 (2012).
270. See id. at 889.
271. Cf. id. at 886-87 (concluding that because federal protection has been extended
multiple times to specific patents or copyrights, as well as classes of patent and copyright
holders, the URAA is constitutional); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 200-01 (2003) (reaching a
similar conclusion).
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the Court had deigned to ask the question. Thus, while this Article
concludes that the differential protection of foreign and domestic
authors is not justified on progress grounds, it is more important that
courts engage in the institutional review than that they reach the
outcomes proposed by the author. The process itself has value.
There are, however, Progress Clause justifications for a
different disparity in the URAA. Congress granted certain
"ameliorating accommodations" for "reliance" parties who used foreign
works before the URAA restored protection.272 Reliance parties may
continue to exploit new works derived from a foreign work, pursuant
to a compulsory license, so long as the derivative work was created
before its copyright was restored.273 The more the derivative work
differs from the restored work, the lower the compensation should be
under the compulsory license. 274 In addition, the URAA obligates the
owner of the foreign work to notify the public of its intent to enforce a
restored copyright.
275
These special privileges for users of restored works are
consistent with the progress values of increasing the knowledge base
and rewarding authors. 276 The public gets access to the reliance
party's new work, and the owner of the restored work gets the
compulsory license as a limited incentive to provide notice to the
reliance party.
C. Compulsory Licenses for Radio Broadcasts
Prior to Thomas Edison's invention of the phonograph, there
was no way to technologically record and reproduce sounds. 277 Soon
after, phonographs and radio broadcasts made it possible to broadly
disseminate performances that first occurred somewhere else. 278 For
272. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(4) (2012) (defining reliance party); Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 878, 891;
see also Linford, Adverse Possessor, supra note 247, at 738, n. 164.
273. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(3) (2012).
274. Id. § 104A(d)(3)(B) (in the absence of an agreement, compensation is to be set by a
district court judge taking into account "the relative contributions of expression of the author of
the restored work and the reliance party to the derivative work").
275. Id. § 104A(e).
276. The Court in Golan was willing to discount the First Amendment challenge in part
because § 104A made some allowance for reliance parties to continue using the restored works,
subject to a compulsory license. See Linford, Adverse Possessor, supra note 247, at 738 n.164.
277. Apparently, the idea of magnetic tape recording was first posited by Sir Francis
Bacon in 1627, but Edison was the first to make a feasible technology for recording sound that
could be reproduced as such. See Jordan S. Gruber, Foundation for Audio Recordings as
Evidence, 23 AM. JUR. PROOF FACTS 3d 315 § 7, n.33 (originally published in 1993, updated Feb.
2014).
278. See Alan Korn, Renaming That Thne: Aural Collage, Parody and Fair Use, 22
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 321 (1992).
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nearly the first hundred years of their existence, sound recordings did
not qualify for federal copyright protection, and the artists who
produced and distributed them relied on the laws of the several states
for protection. 279 Congress first extended an exclusive federal right to
reproduce and distribute to sound recordings in 1972,280 which
continued with the passage of the Copyright Act of 1976.281 Sound
recordings were not covered by the performance right under the 1976
Act because radio broadcasters were accustomed to paying only the
owners of musical works. 282 The owner of the sound recording still
receives no royalty from "terrestrial" radio stations. 283
Congress later crafted a narrower exclusive right to publicly
perform the sound recording via digital audio transmission. 284 The
digital-audio-transmission performance right granted to sound
recordings falls into three tiers, based on the nature of the service that
performs the work. 285 Internet radio stations that stream content
without any listener input, while technically delivering content by
digital audio transmission, are treated like terrestrial radio stations
and are not required to license a performance right from the owner of
the sound recording. 286 At the other extreme, the owner of the sound
recording can secure a property-like injunction against digital
performance by a limited class of operators-those that provide
customers with interactive digital transmissions, 287 i.e., systems that
allow users to pick songs online and play them upon request. 28 8 Thus,
to avoid liability for infringing the digital performance right, operators
of interactive services must pay the owner's asking price.289
279. See Linford, First Publication, supra note 118, at 614-16.
280. Act of Jan. 21, 1971. Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 1(f),
5(n), 19, 20, 26, 101(e)); 37 C.F.R. § 202.8(b) (1972).
281. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(2) (2012), with id. § 106(4).
282. See Erich Carey, We Interrupt This Broadcast: Will the Copyright Royalty Board's
March 2007 Rate Determination Proceedings Pull the Plug on Internet Radio?, 19 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 257, 264 (2008) ("By the time a sound recording copyright was
created in 1972, radio broadcasters had enough political influence to persuade Congress to
exclude sound recordings from claiming a performance right.").
283. Carey, supra note 282, at 266-67 ("Effectively this maintains the status quo; a
broadcast of a sound recording on traditional AM or FM radio still does not constitute a
compensable performance under the Copyright Act after the enactment of the DPRA.").
284. 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2012).
285. Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies of Dissemination,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1629-30 (2001).
286. 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1) (2012).
287. Id. § 114G)(7).
288. Id.
289. Carey, supra note 282, at 287 ("Interactive services do not qualify for statutory
licensing, and hence such services must negotiate privately with record labels for the right use of
sound recordings.").
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In the middle ground, the exclusive right to publicly perform
the sound recording via digital audio transmission is subject to a
compulsory license.290 Operators of subscription services that limit
playback requests may perform the sound recording without
negotiating with the owner of the sound recording, upon payment of a
compulsory license.291 Digital subscription services are available over
cable or satellite, or over the Internet.292  For the former, the
compulsory license rate is calculated pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 801(b).
293
The rate for Internet radio stations is calculated pursuant to 17 U.S.C.
§ 112(e)(4), known as the "willing buyer, willing seller standard."
294
Under both standards, the Copyright Royalty Board-a body
comprised of copyright judges on rotating appointments-makes the
rate determination according to standards set out in the respective
statutes.295 The standards differ, and to date, the § 801(b) rate has
been much lower than the "willing buyer, willing seller" rate.296 When
setting a compulsory license rate for satellite and cable radio stations,
§ 801(b) requires Copyright Royalty Judges to take into account the
interests of all relevant parties potentially affected by copyright
protection, including members of the public.297 The "willing buyer,
willing seller" standard, which governs Internet radio stations,
effectively takes into account only the needs of the copyright owner.
298
Recently, two proposed corrections began wending their way
through Congress. One, the Internet Radio Fairness Act (IRFA),
proposes to reduce the amount that Internet stations pay to the lower
cable and satellite rate under § 801(b). 299 Pandora, one of the largest
Internet radio stations, firmly supports the IRFA. 300  This is
290. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2012); Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Librarian of
Congress, 176 F.3d 528, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (copyright owner of sound recording is required to
grant a license "to those who seek to transmit sound recordings").
291. See Andrew Stockment, Note, Internet Radio: The Case for a Technology Neutral
Royalty Standard, 95 VA. L. REV. 2129, 2138 (2009).
292. See id.
293. Cable and satellite broadcasters can opt out of the compulsory license by negotiating
directly with owners of sound recordings. See id. at 2166.
294. See 17 U.S.C. § 112(e)(4) (2012); see also Stockment, supra note 291, at 2138-39.
295. See id. at 2131.
296. See id. at 2161-62, 2166.
297. 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1) (2012) (compulsory license rates are to maximize the
availability of creative works to the public; secure a fair return to the copyright owner; reflect the
relative contributions, creative and otherwise, by the owner and distributor; and to minimize
disruptive impact on current industry practices).
298. See id. § 114(f)(2)(B); Stockment, supra note 291, at 2165-66.
299. Internet Radio Fairness Act of 2012, S. 3609, 112th Cong (2d Sess. 2012).
300. See Ben Sisario, Proposed Bill Could Change Royalty Rates for Internet Radio, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 23, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/O9/241business/media/proposed-bill-could-
change-royalty-rates-for-internet-radio.html.
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unsurprising, as passage of the IRFA could save Pandora significant
licensing fees. 30 1 The other, the Interim FIRST Act (FIRST Act),
proposes to bring everyone up to the "willing buyer, willing seller"
standard, ostensibly to insure that artists and record labels receive
the compensation to which they are entitled.302
Assuming that licensing uniformity is desirable, and one act or
the other should pass, the IRFA is better suited to serve progress
goals. 30 3  Satellite and cable stations that charge customers for
subscriptions would need to pass an increased license rate required by
the FIRST Act on to consumers, while subscription-based Internet
radio stations could pass savings on to consumers under the IRFA.
Nonsubscription stations would have pass costs, or could pass savings,
on to advertisers. If it proves difficult to recoup the increased
licensing fees, satellite stations that rely on advertising dollars to
provide free Internet music service would need to charge consumers,
or work with smaller profit margins. Implementing the FIRST Act
could thus reduce the number of satellite and cable radio providers,
which in turn would reduce access to less popular programs, as
advertisers are more likely to gravitate to top-40 programming. 304
Thus, access to some Internet programming would be restricted.
In addition, while the owners of musical compositions and
sound recordings would recoup more licensing fees per use under the
FIRST Act, a high compulsory licensing fee is no more consistent with
a natural-right justification for copyright protection than a low one,
regardless of the value of the compulsory license. Furthermore, the
IRFA uses the §801(b) standard, which requires Copyright Royalty
Judges to take into account not only the needs of copyright owners,
but also radio stations as access intermediaries and the public as
listeners. 305 As either compulsory license ignores autonomy interests,
Congress should choose the process that better applies progress values
301. See Andrew Richards, Opinion: Are Pandora's Music Genome Operational Costs
Worth It?, 0 Music AWARDS BLOG (Dec. 5, 2012), http://blog.omusicawards.com/2012/12/opinion-
are-pandoras-music-genome-operational-costs-worth-it.
302. See Jerry Nadler, Interim Fairness in Radio Starting Today Act of 2012 (Aug. 7,
2012, 3:36 PM), http://www.nab.org/documents/newsRoom/pdfs/082012_Nadler_streaming-
rates -bill.pdf; see also Jennifer Martinez, Nadler Circulates Draft Legislation on Music Royalties,
THE HILL: HILLICON VALLEY (Aug. 20. 2012, 6:59 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-
valley/technology/244413-nadler-circulates-draft-legislation-on-music-royalties.
303. But see DiCola, supra note 11 at 1895-99 (arguing that neither IRFA nor the FIRST
Act sufficiently meets a principle grounded in the First Amendment that requires equal
treatment of music distributor).
304. Cf. Steve Johnson, Top 40 Radio is Back on Top, POPMArERS (Oct. 9, 2009),
http://www.popmatters.com/article/112858-top-40-radio-is -back-on-top.
305. See supra notes 293-298 and accompanying text.
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and also leads to lower costs.3 0 6  Here, the institutional review
framework gives us a fairly clear indication of which statutory
enactment the public should support.
IV. PUBLIC INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
When invited to consider First Amendment critiques of the
Copyright Act, the Court has been reluctant to apply traditional First
Amendment scrutiny, although it has continued to recognize that
First Amendment values are inherent in the copyright regime.30 7 The
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have even stepped back from the active
policing of intellectual property protection demonstrated by the
Warren Court. For example, in Graham v. John Deere Co.,308 the
Court held that the state could not secure to an inventor a patent on
an invention already in the public domain.30 9 Turning again to the
question of the permeability of the public domain in Golan, the Court
characterized as dicta the oft-cited perspective from Graham that the
Progress Clause limits Congress's power to craft intellectual property
protections. 310 The Court in Golan found the Graham holding that an
invention was not eligible for patent protection entirely unrelated to
the question of Congress' power to increase a patent's duration. 311 As
the Tenth Circuit noted in its review of Golan, "Congress has
expansive powers when it legislates under the [Progress] Clause, and
this court may not interfere so long as Congress has rationally
exercised its authority."
312
One way to read Golan, and its predecessor Eldred, is that
together they suggest that the current Court is simply uninterested in
claims that congressional activity in the intellectual property sphere
should remain within the boundaries set by the Progress Clause and
306. But see DiCola, supra note 11 at 1897 (criticizing IRFA's focus on drastically
lowering royalty rates for webcasters because "[e]qual treatment [of music distribution services)
has economic benefits that have nothing to do with reducing the level of royalties, which is a
separate policy choice.").
307. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
308. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
309. See id. at 6 (holding that "Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose
effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to
materials already available"); see also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229-30
(1964) (patents may issue, under the Progress Clause, only when "a genuine 'invention' or
'discovery' [can] be demonstrated," and limitations on the exercise of the patent must be "strictly
enforced" (internal citations omitted)).
310. See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 887 (2012).
311. See id. (citing Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 202, n.7 (2003)).
312. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Eldred, 537 U.S. at
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the First Amendment. 313 The Supreme Court's deferential stance in
Eldred and Golan leaves the public without an effective ex post check
on congressional activity. Any amendments to the Copyright Act that
cross the President's desk with a signature may be effectively immune
from institutional review.
While this Article makes the case for carefully scrutinizing
institutional tailoring, it is possible that the Court cannot be moved
from looking at copyright as the kind of regime "that does not need to
be subjected to normal First Amendment [or Progress Clause]
analysis."314 But pressing the issue, even on the losing side, has some
inherent value. As Professor Schauer notes, "winning is better than
losing publicly, but losing publicly is perhaps still preferable to being
ignored." 315  Ideally, a renewed focus on disparate treatment will
encourage the Supreme Court to apply more searching constitutional
analysis of the Copyright Act, at least where the disparate protection
signals potential public choice problems. 316 And there has been some
positive motion-eight of the Justices in Eldred "acknowledged that
the First Amendment was not totally irrelevant. '" 317
Furthermore, public losses can motivate public responses. For
example, when the Supreme Court decided, in Kelo v. City of New
London, that using eminent domain to seize the homes of residents to
build a business complex was a "public use" under the Takings Clause,
state and local law-making bodies responded quickly to mollify public
disapproval.318 David Fagundes has noted that the public outcry to
the Court's decision in Eldred was relatively muted.31 9 More recently,
however, the public has been motivated to respond to proposed
legislation that looks like a congressional overreach in the intellectual
property realm. In 2011, the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) was
introduced in the House of Representatives, 320 and the Preventing
Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual
313. Subsequent courts construing Eldred conclude that the case stands "for the
proposition that it is for Congress, not courts, to determine what promotes progress." Oliar,
supra note 2, at 1834 (citing Figueroa v. United States, 66 Fed. C1. 139, 150-52 (2005)).
314. Adrian Liu, Copyright as Quasi-Public Forum: Reinterpreting the Conflict Between
Copyright and the First Amendment, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 383, 397
(2008).
315. Schauer, Boundaries, supra note 5, at 1799.
316. See id. at 1800.
317. See id. at 1799. See also Netanel, Constraints After Golan, supra note 64, at 1096-97
(arguing that the Court's talk of traditional contours provides a stronger standard for First
Amendment than is apparent at first).
318. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489-90 (2005); David Fagundes,
Property Rhetoric and the Public Domain, 94 MINN. L. REV. 652, 652-53 (2010).
319. See id. at 653-54.
320. Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011).
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Property Act (PIPA) was introduced in the Senate. 321 The bills
included "highly technical DNS blocking provisions that were strongly
opposed by engineers, Internet founders, and law professors. '" 322 The
opposition of informed parties was a starting point, but the passage of
SOPA and PIPA seemed fait accompli until the general public-tipped
off by a day of Internet blackouts on popular services like
Wikipedia-responded en mass to protests the bills.323  While the
public response was certainly encouraged by ISPs and intermediaries
who viewed it as a threat to the operation of the Internet, 324 it was the
public response, not the centralized opposition, that sent legislators of
all political stripes scurrying to distance themselves from the bill.
325
There are two problems facing public advocacy on copyright
policy. The institutional review framework can help ameliorate both.
First, statutory language can be complex, particularly for recent
revisions to the Act. 326 This complexity tends to exacerbate the second
problem: it is difficult for a diffuse populace to mobilize as effectively
as a smaller, concentrated group with similar goals. This collective
action problem makes public advocacy difficult, demonstrably so when
we consider the way copyright law is shaped in favor of copyright
owners, often without considering the needs of copyright users.
327
The institutional review framework can facilitate activism,
encouraging both copyright critics and enthusiasts to ask at an early
stage whether new additions to the Copyright Act are consistent with
the congressional mandate. If the Court plans to continue its
historical hands-off approach when reviewing copyright enactments
for constitutional validity, perhaps the public can crowd source some
321. PROTECT IP Act of 2011, S. 968, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011).
322. David S. Levine, Bring in the Nerds: Secrecy, National Security, and the Creation of
International Intellectual Property Law, 30 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 105, 137 (2012). "DNS" is
an acronym for the Internet's Domain Name System. Id. at 112.
323. See, e.g., Jonathan Weisman, After an Online Firestorm, Congress Shelves
Antipiracy Bills, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com2012/01/21/
technology/senate-postpones-piracy-vote.html?_r=l& (reporting that more than 10 million voters
contacted lawmakers to voice opposition to the bills).
324. See Maayan Y. Vodovis, Note, Look over Your Figurative Shoulder: How to Save
Individual Dignity and Privacy on the Internet, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 811, 824-25, n.120 (2012).
325. See Annemarie Bridy, Copyright Policymaking as Procedural Democratic Process: A
Discourse-Theoretic Perspective on ACTA, SOPA, and PIPA, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 153,
154 (2012) ("Neither SOPA nor PIPA will become law as they were initially drafted ....");
Stephanie Condon, PIPA, SOPA Put on Hold in Wake of Protests, CBS NEWS (Jan. 20, 2012),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-57362675-503544/pipa-sopa-put-on-hold-in-wake-of-
protests.
326. See, e.g., Joseph Liu, supra note 80, at 89, 110.
327. See Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights
Management", 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 535-36 (1998).
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hands-on responses. 32  The institutional review framework will
provide a way to think about when action might be required. With
luck, pressure from both courts and the public will encourage the
legislative and executive branches to consider the impact of copyright
legislation on our constitutional values of preventing the abridgement
of speech and promoting of progress. At all stages, applying the
institutional review framework can flush out the most obvious and
problematic cases of institutional tailoring.
It is hard to imagine frequent negative public responses to
copyright legislation like those that met SOPA and PIPA.
Nevertheless, the institutional review framework can give the public
something relatively obvious to watch for.329 Where a copyright
provision gives extra protection to certain copyright holding
institutions rather than all copyright holders, or provides a defense to
one institutional user rather than the public as a whole, society should
collectively ask whether the disparate treatment is consistent with
constitutional values. If not, this could serve as a signal that a
bottom-up, crowd-sourced response is appropriate.
Drawing the attention of courts and the public to disparate
treatment does not prevent either group from giving careful scrutiny
to situations where disparate treatment is not apparent on the face of
a statute. The Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence, for
example, is full of cases where a statute that is content-neutral on its
face is held unconstitutional because it provides too much discretion to
the executive. 330  The Court is capable of locating problematic
discretion in those cases and would be able to apply the same skill set
to determine if statutes that are ostensibly egalitarian nevertheless
threaten critical constitutional values. The institutional review
framework simply provides a structure to consider problematic
disparity in the Copyright Act.
CONCLUSION
This Article lays bare the tension between the Supreme Court's
extreme distrust of speaker-based speech restrictions and the Court's
extremely deferential embrace of Congress's authority to pass
328. See supra notes 64-67, 307-313 and accompanying text.
329. Unlike the response to Kelo, however, there is no direct appeal that the public can
make to local jurisdictions to resolve problematic copyright enactments, where the federal
statute preempts the field. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012). Still, to the extent members of Congress
are at all sensitive to public pressure, some localized displeasure voiced in the right cases is more
likely to cause members of Congress to reconsider their stance than no response at all. See supra
notes 323-327 and accompanying text.
330. See, e.g., Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133, n.10 (1992).
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copyright legislation that differentiates between institutions.
Consistency might suggest stripping all disparate treatment from the
Copyright Act, but some disparity may promote the goals embodied in
the Progress Clause. At a minimum, examining the institutional
tailoring in the Copyright Act by asking which, if any, favored
institutions externalize Progress Clause values should sharpen
judicial review, shape congressional activity, and provide a path for
public action with regard to copyright reform.

